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NOTES
Constitutional Law
DELEGATION AND SEPARABILITY ASPECTS OP THE HOUSING AM
RENT ACT OF

1949*

Recent court decisions interpreting the Housing and Rent Act of
1949,1 present an interesting conflict on the issue of the Act's constitutionality, specifically as respects Congress' power to delegate its
legislative authority. A federal district court in Illinois recently held,
*A decision by the Supreme Court on the issue of the constitutionality of the

Housing and Rent Act of 1949 appeared imminent as this note was being prepared and set in print. The present note has been prepared with a view toward
presenting various issues which might arise in determining the validity either of
the instant Act or any similar pieces of legislation subsequently enacted; i.e.,
while discussion of the issues has been specifically related to the provisions of the
rent Act, the issues so presented are merely applied to, and not limited by, the
provisions of that particular Act.
1 Pub. L. No. 31, 81st Cong., Ist Sess. (Mar. 29, 1949). This Act amends the
1947 Act, 61 STAT. 196 (1947), as amended, So U.S.C. App. 1 1891 et seq. (Supp.

1949).
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in Woods v. Shoreline Cooperative Apartments, Inc., et al.,2 that the
Act is an unconstitutional delegation of the legislative power of Congress insofar as the "local option" provisions 8 are concerned, and that
these provisions are not separable from the remaining portiofis of the4
Act, despite the presence therein of a standard separability clause.
Thus the entire Act was, under the reasoning of the court, wholly
unconstitutional. Squarely opposed to the holding in the Shoreline
case is the subsequent decision .handed down by a federal district
court in California, in United States v. Emery et al.5 This case upheld
the "local option" provisions as a valid delegation of congressional
power to the states and local communities. In a third case, United
States v. Resch,6 a federal district judge in Kentucky has stated that
the "iocal option" provisions are valid, and that even if any of them
were declared invalid, they would be separable from the rest of the
Act. These decisions serve to point up some of the rather novel aspects
of the problem of the permissible limits of Congress' delegation of its
legislative power as raised by the recent rent control Act.
The scope of this note will be restricted to: a brief examination of
the history of rent control legislation in the United States; the problem of delegation of congressional legislative power to the states and
local communities under the Housing and Rent Act of 1949; the
operation of the separability clause which is included in the Act. It
will be assumed that the war powers, from which derive the congressional authority to pass any sort of rent control legislation, may
7
still be validly exercised.
It would be well at the outset. to clarify the sense in which
term "delegation of legislative power" will be used. This phrase
been utilized by some courts to denote unconstitutionality per
while in other courts a delegation in itself is not conclusive of

the
has
se,8
un-

84 F. Supp. 660 (N. D. Ill. 1949).
8 Note 1 supra,at § 204 (j) (1), (2), (3) of the Act as amended.
4 Note I supra, at § 303 of the Act as amended.
5 85 F. Supp. 354 (S. D. Calif. 1949).
6 85 F. Supp. 389 (W. D. Ky. 1949). A fourth "test" suit was recently begun in Chicago before a special three-judge court. N. Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1949, p.
31, col. 1. Early interest in the progress of this case has dwindled since the Supreme Court has agreed to -hear the Shoreline case in the near future. See 18 L. W.
2

3118 (1949).
Both the Shoreline and Emery cases proceeded on this assumption.
Early eases which seem to proceed upon this theory include: The Brig
Aurora, 7 Cranch 382, 3 L. Ed. 379 (U. S. 1813); Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649,
12 S. Ct. 495, 36 L. Ed. 294 (1892); United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506, 31
S. Ct. 480, 55 L. Ed. 563 (1911); Locke's Appeal, 72 Pa. 491 (1873); cf. more
recent cases, where conferring of regulatory power was held to be a mere limitation by Congress of its own power. United States v. Rock Royal Cooperative,
Inc., et al., 307 U. S. 553, 59 S. Ct. 993, 83 L. Ed. 1446 (1939) and Currin v.
Wallaae, 306 U. S. 1, 59 S. Ct. 379, 83 L. Ed. 441 (1939).
7
8
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constitutionality, but merely presents the further and more important
question of whether such delegation is "valid" or "invalid." 9 The
tendency of courts today is to recognize, realistically, that many of
the broad powers delegated by Congress are, to some extent at least,
legislative in nature.' 0 In accordance with this trend, the use of the
term "delegation of legislative power," for the purposes of this note,
will not of itself indicate an unconstitutional delegation, but will merely
raise the further question of the validity of such delegation.
I.
Although the broad issue upon which the problems arising under
the Act turn-namely, the issue of delegation of legislative powerreaches down into the roots of American constitutional history," comprehensive federal rent control legislation was unknown in the United
States until the recent war. The only federal act of general application in the first World War was the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief
Act of 1918,12 which merely protected families of service men from
eviction and distress during their period of service, if rentals were not
more than fifty dollars per month. Congress also passed a rent control
act of a more comprehensive nature for the District of Columbia,
which provided, with certain exceptions, that no judgments of eviction should issue for the duration of the war where tenants held
under leases of one month or longer. 13 Five states passed rent control acts during the first World War, 14 but general housing conditions
apparently did not warrant widespread legislation.
With the advent of the second World War, Congress, under the
authority of its war powers, passed the Emergency Price Control Act
of 1942,15 which provided, inter alia, for the establishment, at the
9 As long ago as 1916, Elihu Root stated that,
various administrative boards, "the old doctrine
legislative power has virtually retired from the field
Public Service By Tke Bar, 2 A.B.A.J. 736, 749

as the result of the creation of
prohibiting the delegation of
and given up the fight." Root,
(1916). See an excellent and

realistic discussion of delegation, in which the court construes J. W. Hampton, ,r.
& Co. v. United States-, 276 U. S. 394, 48 S. Ct. 348, 72 L. Ed. 624 (1928), as
recognizing a permissible area of delegation of legislative powers. State ex rel.
Wisconsin Inspection Bureau v. Whitman, 196 Wis. 472, 220 N. W. 929 (1928).
See also Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of Legislative Power: II, 42 CoL. L. REv.
561 (1947); Cousens, The Delegation of Federal Legislative Power to Executive
Officials, 33 Mic. L. Rv.512 (1934).
10 Authorities cited note 9 supra.
11 See, e.g., the early cases cited note 8 supra.
12 40 STAT.440 (1918).
Is Id. at 443, § 300 (1).
14 See 51 HAIv. L. REv.427, 497 (1942), citing D
IICaE AND EmEy, RENT
CoNTRoL n- WAR AND PEAcE 16-20 (1939); see also, as to state rent control during
and after the first World War, 95 Cong. Rec. 2956 (Mar. 22, 1949).
15 56 STAT. 23 (1942).
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discretion of the Price Administrator, of controls over rental housing
units in defense rental areas. 16 The broad powers given to the Administrator under this Act reflected the well-founded fear of the economic
repercussions of the war. The purpose of the Act, as set forth in
Section I (a), was, in part, "to stabilize prices and to prevent speculative, unwarranted, and abnormal increases in prices and rents'; to
eliminate and prevent profiteering . . . and other disruptive practices

resulting from abnormal market conditions or scarcities caused by or
contributing to the national emergency. . .

."

In 1944, the Act, as

amended,17 was amended to allow the Administrator to decontrol
rental units in areas where he found that there were adequate rental
facilities, or where for other reasons rent control was no longer necessary.' 8 In 1946, a Congressional change of policy was declared:
".. . that unnecessary or unduly prolonged controls over prices and
rents and use of subsidies would be inconsistent with a return to . . .
a peacetime economy." 19 In 1947, the duty of administering rent
controls passed from the Office of Price Administration to the Office
of the Housing Expediter, under the terms of the Housing and Rent
Act of 1947.20 The reason for the shift, of course, was the prospective
expiration of the Emergency Price Control Act, and the realization
by Congress, at the same time, of the continued need for federal rent
controls. Congress, in this new Act, affirmed the policy of the 1946
price control legislation, and further stated that it was the congressional
purpose "to terminate at the earliest practicable date, all Federal restrictions on rents on housing accommodations." 21
Under the 1947 Act, the Housing Expediter was given substantially
the same discretionary powers 22 to decontrol defense rental areas as
had been given the Price Administrator under the earlier price control
acts. However, the Expediter was directed to set up local advisory
boards consisting of persons who were "representative citizens of the
area," to be appointed by the Expediter from recommendations made
by the respective Governors of the states. These local boards could
make recommendations to the Expediter for decontrol of defense
rental areas or portions thereof, subject to the approval of the Expediter. The action of the Expediter in approving or disapproving of
these recommendations was not entirely discretionary, however. It
was provided that: 23
16 Id. at 24, § 2 (a).
17 56 STAT. 23 (1942), as amended, 57 STAT. 566 (1943).
18 56
19

20

STAT.

23 (1942), as amended, 58 STAT. 633 (1944).

56 STAT. 23 (1942), as amended, 60 STAT. 664 (1946).
61 STAT. 196 (1947), as amended, 50 U. S. C. App. 1891 et seq. (Supp.

1949), Pub. L. No. 31, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (Mar. 29, 1949).
21 Id. at § 201 (a) of the 1947 Act. It is interesting to note that this section
remained unchanged in the 1948 and 1949 amendments to the original Act.
22 Id. at § 204.
23 Id. at§ 204 (e) (3).
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Any recommendation of a local board appropriately substantiated
and in accordance with applicable law and regulations shall be approved
and appropriate action shall promptly be taken to carry such recommendations into effect.

The meaning of this section was clarified in the 1948 amendment
of the Act, which provided that a recommendation should be deemed
ccappropriately substantiated and in accordance with applicable law
and regulations" if the local board: held a public hearing; gave proper
notice of the place, date and purpose of the hearing; filed a copy of
the recommendation with the Governor; kept a record of the proceedings and sent a copy thereof, along with its findings and recommendations, to the Expediter; and if the record contained adequate and
substantial evidence to support the findings and recommendations of
24
the local board.
It was with this background of federal rent control legislation, and
during the difficult transitional period between the war and the prospective return to a stabilized, normal economy that Congress, after
extended committee and floor hearings and debates, passed the Housing
and Rent Act of 1949. Included in this Act, in addition to the extension of many of the provisions of the previous rent acts, were the
unique and presently controverted provisions for ending federal rent
control at the option of state and local governing units.2 5
Congressional dissatisfaction with the progress of decontrol 26 under
the previous rent control acts, which had vested virtually all decontrol
powers in the Housing Expediter, coupled with the desire to end all
federal rent controls at the earliest possible time,2 7 led to the inclusion
of the "local option" provisions in the 1949 Act. Consideration of these
provisions will involve an examination of two fundamental problems.
(1) Do the provisions giving the states and local governing units an
opportunity to end federal rent control amount to a delegation of
congressional legislative power; or are these provisions merely a
limitation by Congress on the operation of its own law? (2) If any
of the provisions do amount to a delegation, is the delegation valid,
or is it an unconstitutional abdication by Congress of its legislative
prerogatives?
II.
Section 204 (j) (1) of the Housing and Rent Act provides:
Whenever the governor of any State advises the Housing Expediter
that the legislature of such State has adequately provided for the establishment and maintenance of maximum rents, or has specifically expressed its intent that State rent control shall be in lieu of Federal rent
24 Id. at § 204 (e) (4) of the 1947 Act, as amended, 50 U. S. C. App. § 1894
(Supp. 1949).

25 See note 3 supra.

See, e.g., 95 Cong. Rec. 2521-6 (Mar. 15, 1949); 95 Cong. Rec. 2362-3
(Mar. 11, 1949).
27 See note 21 supra.
26
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control, with respect to housing accommodations within defense-rental
areas in such State and of the date on which such State rent control
will become effective, the Housing Expediter shall immediately make
public announcement to the effect that he has been so advised. At the
same time all rent controls under this Act, as amended, with respect to
housing accommodations within such State shall be terminated as of the
date on which State rent control is to become effective. As used in this
subsection, the term "State" means any State, Territory, or possession
of the United States.

Under this subsection, it would seem that Congress has merely
given the states an opportunity, in lieu of federal rent control, to enact
their own laws on the same subject matter. The power under which
the states would enact rent control laws, is, of course, derived from
their inherent police power, and not from the war powers. That the
states, in the exercise of their police power, can enact valid rent control
laws has been affirmed by the Supreme Court in Marcus Brown Hold29
8
ing Company v. Feldman 2 and Edgar A. Levy Company v. Siegel.
The subsection of the Housing and Rent Act presently under discussion does not specifically direct the states to take action to terminate rent control; furthermore, such action, if taken, need not have
any reference to the emergency war powers, even though as a practical matter the need for rent control at this time obviously derives
from the economic aftermath of the war, whether so stated or not.
In any event, these provisions for decontrol seem proper in view of
the fact that the states have power to pass rent control laws independently of the war effort, so long as Congress agrees, as it appears
to have done under this subsection, that its own law, which can be
based only on the war powers, shall not take precedence.
The provisions of this subsection are not strictly analogous either
to state home rule or state "local option" laws, since the powers of the
various state subdivisions in those instances are derived only from
the states, while the power of the state is, in the matter of rent control, coexistent with, and not derived from federal power.
It should be noted that if the states, under this subsection of the
Act, were authorized to exercise a continuing power to administer the
federal law, this would of course amount to a delegation, valid or
invalid, of congressional legislative power. But it might well be
argued that this section, as it stands, is not a delegation of any congressional power, since, as has been pointed out, the states likewise
have the power, though on a different basis, to enact rent control
legislation, and since, by providing the states with the opportunity to
provide their own controls, Congress has merely put a voluntary
28 256 U. S. 170, 41 S. Ct. 465, 6S L. Ed. 877 (1921). Despite this case, the
Illinois district court in the Shoreline case thought the existence of such power
doubtful. 84 F. Supp. 660, 662 (N. D. Ill. 1949).
29 258 U. S. 242, 42 S. Ct. 289, 66 L. Ed. 595 (1922).
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limitation on the operation and applicability of its own Act. Under
this view, it does not become necessary to discuss, in this subsection,
the question whether sufficient standards are laid down by Congress
to guide the states-a question which would only arise if the subsection were construed to be a delegation of congressional legislative
power to the states.3 0 Under the concurrent powers theory which has
been developed, it would not be the proper concern of Congress to
tell the states how to exercise their own legislative powers. Likewise,
it is not necessary to consider whether the absence of concurrent
powers would conclusively establish that the provisions of this subsection involve delegation rather than congressional limitation. However, it seems pertinent to point out that, in addition to the concurrent
powers theory, the constitutionality of this subsection might be upheld
on the authority of United States v. Rock Royal Cooperative, Inc.,
et al.3 1 and Currin v. Wallace,3 2 in which individuals were given the
power to determine whether an order issued under a congressional act
was to apply to them. This power was held to be only a limitation
by Congress on the operation of its own act, and not a delegation.
These cases may be distinguishable on their facts from the situation
presented under the rent Act, and the concurrent state powers theory
would seem to be a sounder basis upon which to argue the constitutionality of this subsection of the Act. The Rock Royal and Currin
cases are discussed further under subsection (j) (3) of the Act.
The only remaining issue as to this subsection, then, is whether it is
separable from any other section of the Act which might be declared
33
unconstitutional.
Section 204 (j) (2) provides:
If any State by law declares that Federal rent control is no longer
necessary in such State or any part thereof and notifies the Housing
Expediter of that fact, the Housing Expediter shall immediately make
public announcement to the effect that he has been so advised. At the
same time all rent controls under this act, as amended, with respect to
housing accommodations within such State or part thereof shall be terminated on the fifteenth day after receipt of such advice. As used in
this subsection, the term "State" means any State, Territory, or possession
of the United States.

It would seem that the same reasoning as was applied to subsection
204 (j) (1) might likewise be applied here. Since the states (insofar
as their laws do not conflict with federal laws on the same subject
matter) can enact rent control laws, 34 and since Congress can validly
limit the operation of its own law,35 Congress has, under this sub-

33
34

The question of standards is discussed infra.
307 U. S. 553; 59 S. Ct. 993, 83 L. Ed. 1446 (1939).
306 U. S. 1, 59 S. Ct. 379, 55 L. Ed. 563 (1939).
The question of separability is discussed infra, under section III.
See notes 28 and 29 supra.

35

See, e.g., the Rock Royal and Currin cases, cited notes 31 and 32 supra.

30

31
32
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section, merely placed a limitation on its own act by allowing the
states to determine, under their own police powers, that no rent control is necessary. It would not seem to be an important distinction
that one state law would continue rent control under a system of its
own, while another would abolish it completely, since what Congress
has done in both subsections 204 (j) (1) and 204 (j) (2) is to give
the states a green light to legislate on the subject as they deem desirable.
A further question might arise, however, with respect to the role of
the Governor of a state under this subsection. Is it within the discretion
of the Governor to determine whether the state law is adequate and
to refuse to advise the Housing Expediter as prescribed by this subsection if the Governor should feel that the law which the legislature
has passed is inadequate? 36 If the Governor does have such discretion, then it would appear that the power to determine whether
the federal law should continue to apply is not derived from concurrent
legislative power alone, but rather is an attempt by Congress to delegate its power to a state executive officer. It is not clear that discretion is granted to the Governor under the wording of this section,
however, and the problem of delegation to local officers is more
squarely presented under section 204 (j) (3).
Section 204 (j) (3) provides:
The Housing Expediter shall terminate the provisions of this title in
any incorporated city, town or village upon receipt of a resolution of its
governing body adopted for that purpose in accordance with applicable
local law and based upon a finding by such governing body reached as
a result of a public hearing held after 10 days' notice, that there no
longer exists such a shortage in rental housing accommodations as to
require rent control in such. city, town or village; Provided, however,
That such resolution is first approved by the Governor of the State before
being transmitted to the Housing Expediter; And provided further,
That where the major portion of a defense-rental area has been decontroled pursuant to this paragraph (3), the Housing Expediter shall decontrol any unincorporated locality in the remainder of such area. (Emphasis partially supplied.)
The provisions of this subsection clearly place the process of decontrol outside the realm of concurrent state legislative power. Thus
the general problem of the delegation of congressional legislative
power is inescapably presented. The argument might be advanced that
the power of the local governing units to determine, under this subsection, whether the federal law is to continue to apply is merely, as
in subsections (j) (1) and (j) (2), a voluntary limitation by Congress
on the operation of its own Act. But a distinction may be drawn, in
that in the latter instances a concurrent power already existed in the
s6 That the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, to which the Housing and Rent Act of 1949 was referred, considered this language to vest discretion in the Governor, see section on State Action, Sax. REP. No. 127, 81st Cong.,
1st Sess. (1949).
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states, and Congress had merely indicated its readiness to step out
of the way of the exercise of that power. But, as pointed out, no
such concurrent power exists in local governing units. The Rock Royal
and Currin cases involved situations somewhat analogous to the "local
option" provisions of subsection (j) (3), and might seem, at first, to
be authority for the proposition that the latter is a limitation by Congress on the application of its own Act. The Rock Royal case involved
37
the constitutionality of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act,
under which the Secretary of Agriculture had authority to promulgate
orders designed to carry out the stated policy of the Act. Such orders
were only to go into effect when two-thirds of the producers of a
particular commodity, in the locality involved, approved them. The
Court, in upholding the Act, concerned itself mainly with the sufficiency of standards which had been set down for the guidance of the
Secretary in formulating such orders. The problem of delegation of
congressional authority to the local producers was passed over lightly.
Under similar facts in the Currin case, in which the constitutionality
of the Tobacco Inspection Act 3s was in issue, the validity of submitting an order of the Secretary of Agricu'ture which affected a given
locality to a referendum of the local producers affected thereby was
specifically upheld. -The Court was of the opinion that Congress had
merely placed a restriction on its own law by with-holding its operation where more than one-third of the tobacco growers opposed the
order. These cases would seem to indicate, since the power of individuals to determine the application of an administrative order was
held not to amount to a delegation, that the existence or non-existence
of concurrent power is not a conclusive test of whether a delegation
or a mere limitation is involved. In any event, there seem to be other
considerations which would distinguish those cases from the situation
involved under subsection (j) (3) of the.Housing and Rent Act. The
right to determine whether an entire congressional act is to apply is
certainly a broader power than is sanctioned under either the Rock
Royal or the Gurrincase, although it might be argued that the difference
is one of degree and not of kind. Furthermore, it may be suggested
that in the Rock Royal and Currin cases, the Court found it necessary
to avoid acknowledging that the power given to the producers constituted a delegation of any sort if the acts involved were to be sustained. That power of some sort was given is obvious; but the Court
looked at the obverse side of the coin-at the fact that the giving of
power to prevent the orders from taking effect was a voluntary limitation by Congress on its own laws. It would seem that both a limitation
and a delegation of power were present under these acts. Inasmuch
as the power given was to approve or disapprove administrative orders
87

50 STAT.

8 49

STAT.

246

(1937),

as amended,

7

U.S.C. § 601

(Supp. 1948).

731 (1935), as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 501 (1946).
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only, it could be termed only a quasi-legislative power, though the
fact that such orders, once effective, had the force of law makes this
appear to be a hairline distinction. Considered as legislative power,
the delegation would seem to be of doubtful validity because of the
lack of standards for the guidance of the producers in exercising this
power. Thus the difficulty of upholding acts otherwise beneficial if the
fact of delegation were recognized may have had something to do with
the terminology adopted by the Court in the Rock Royal and Currin
cases.
In the earlier case of Carter v. Carter Coal Company, et al.,39
where an affirmative and broader power devolved upon individualsthe power to set wages and hours for the coal industry-the giving of
such power to individuals was denounced by the Court as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. The fact that the power
granted under the Rock Royal and Currin cases was only negative,
and affected only executive orders, may justify considering it as a
delegation of merely quasi-legislative powers, or, assuming that there
were sufficient standards, as a permissible delegation of legislative
power; but where such a power is conferred by Congress on others,
it is difficult to see how it can be said that there is no delegation of
any sort.
Assuming for purposes of discussion that the power to determine
the applicability of federal rent controls under the Housing and Rent
Act of 1949 is a delegation, valid or invalid, we come to the question
whether under the Act congressional power can properly be delegated to
local governing units of the states. The problem here is rather novel,
since the question usually arises in connection with the delegation of
federal power to other branches of the Federal Government. Local
boards operating within the states under a federal authority and administering a federal law have been sustained when members of such boards
have had no organic affiliation with local governing units, e.g., local rent
control and O.P.A. offices. 40 However, the powers exercised by these
local units were sustained on the theory that there was no invalid delegation by Congress of its legislative power; since local governing units
were not involved in the local administration of these laws, the question which is now presented under subsection (j) (3) did not arise.
Even if, under this subsection, there were deemed to be no delegation
of congressional legislative power which would be improper if made
to a federal board operating under a federal authority, it would seem
that the delegation of any congressional authority to local governing
units offends the concept of the division of powers under our consti298 U. S. 238, 56 S. Ct. 855, 80 L. Ed. 1160 (1936).
Woods v. Miller, 333 U. S. 138, 68 S. Ct. 421, 92 L. Ed. 596 (1948);
Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U. S. 503, 64 S. Ct. 641, 88 L. Ed. 892 (1944); Yakus
v. United States, 321 U. S. 414, 64 S. Ct. 660, 88 L. Ed. 892 (1944).
39
40
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tutional system of government. There have been instances, under federal statutes, in which local officers have been appointed to serve concurrently in similar federal positions. But the exercise of such federal
and state powers remained at all times separate and distinct, and any
action under the federal authority in these cases was purely ministerial
and admitted of no power to vary the federal law in any respect. At
least one prominent writer has compiled examples of such instances
41
and has stated:
Apparently there has been no federal or state legislation expressly
designating the administrative officers of the one government as agents
of the other. Indeed, such "blanket" appointments would, in some cases,
meet constitutional difficulties . . . But much cooperation between the
Union and the states has been effected by the executive appointment,
with or without express authority of law, of state officers as federal
officers and federal officers as state officers. Thus the state foresters become federal foresters, the local health authorities federal "epidemicologists," the state employment officers federal employment directors, sheriffs
deputy marshals, state prohibition officers federal prohibition officers; and
other such appointments are made where the federal and state governments perform corresponding functions. (Emphasis supplied.)

Under the Selective Draft Act for the first World War, the President
was given authority to create draft boards "to be chosen from among
the local authorities of such subdivisions or from other citizens residing
in the subdivision" 42 and, in addition, "to utilize the service of any or
all departments and any or all officers or agents of the United States
and of the several States. .... ,, 43 The validity of this Act was challenged on various grounds, among which was the contention that it
involved an unconstitutional delegation of federal authority to state
officials. The Supreme Court, in upholding the constitutionality of the
Act, stated that this objection was "too wanting in merit to require
further notice." 44 The fact that these appointments would not necessitate an overlapping of federal and state functions would seem to have
been a significant factor in the decision of this case, along with the existence of a national emergency.
Can it be said that in subsection (j) (3) of the Housing and Rent
Act, as in the examples just cited, Congress is merely for the sake
of convenience utilizing a body which already exists, at the same
time considering it as federally, and not locally constituted for this
particular purpose? This could hardly be the case, since the Act
specifies that the body shall conform to local law in carrying out its
functions under the Act. It was clearly Congress' purpose to shift the
41 Barnett, Cooperation Between the Federal and State Governments, 17 NAT.
MuNmc. Rmv. 283, 287 (1928).
42 40 STAT. 79 (1917).
43 Id. at 80, § 6.
44 Arver v. United States, 245 U. S. 366, 389, 38 S. Ct. 159, 62 L. Ed. 349
(1918).
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legislative burden to the Governors and local officials in this section of
the Act, and to let them, acting as local officials primarily, terminate
federal rent control when they thought it desirable. Hence the failure
to give this power to the already existing local rent boards. Congress
sought to give the localities authority to act on their own, apart from
the federally constituted Housing Expediter and rent boards, so that
if they were dissatisfied with the speed of decontrol by the federal
officers, they could, in their capacity as local officers, take the matter
into their own hands.45 It is submitted that the spirit and letter alike
of our federal system of government inveigh against such a delegation
of federal authority to the political subdivisions of the states.
To state that it makes no real difference whether a local unit is
created originally by the state-that the above argument upholds form
over substance-is to argue that there is no real division of powers,
if such statement is made where, as here, a local unit as such exercises
federal powers. In this case it is also to overlook certain facts leading
to the enactment of subsection (j) (3). The Congressional Record
reveals that some Senators, at least, had grave doubts as to the constitutionality of this subsection. Senator Pepper commented: 46
It seems to me that there is very questionable authority for the Government of the United States to delegate to a subordinate political,
subdivision what amounts, for all practical purposes, to the exercise of
legislative authority. We have gone far enough, it seems to me, in authorizing any State to enact a law setting up its own rent-control system
covering the whole State, and, upon the facts being certified by the governor, eliminating that State from the area of Federal control . . . But,
Mr. President, the Congress of the United States cannot properly delegate
legislative authority. I think Congress should meet the issue squarely.
We should either legislate upon rent control or get out of the field and
leave it to the local authorities to legislate. If the municipalities want
rent control, we should leave it up to them and to the States to provide
it, if the Federal Government abandons the field. But this is a curious
kind of arrangement, when we legislate, and we do not legislate, on rent
control,

Arguments supporting the constitutionality of the subsection were
also made in the Senate, 47 and the fact that the bill as passed included
this subsection would seem to indicate that a majority of the Congress
either considered the subsection to be constitutional or did not consider the problem.
There is an analogy which may be cited as favoring the validity
of subsection (j) (3) (aside from the question of sufficiency of stand45 See, e.g., 95 Cong. Rec. 2981, 3404 (Mar. 22, 1949) (Senators McClellan
and Fulton favoring the proposal); 95 Cong. Rec. 2984-S (Mar. 22, 1949) (Senators Pepper and Humphrey recognizing the purpose, but opposing the proposal).
46 95 Cong. Rec. 2984 (Mar. 22, 1949) ; see also argument of Sen. Sparkman,
95 Cong. Rec. 2875-6 (Mar. 21, 1949).
47 95 Cong. Rec. 2956 (Mar. 22, 1949); 95 Cong. Rec. 2879-80 (Mar. 21,
1949).

NOTES
ards, discussed infra): the long-established practice of allowing cases
involving federal statutes to be litigated in the state courts.48 But
some distinction may be found in the constitutional provision that the
laws of Congress shall be binding on all the states; 4 9 since this is
true, it seems only logical to allow the state courts to enforce such
laws directly. But in point of fact, no convincing justification for this
practice seems to exist; it has been declared to exist simply on the
basis of respect for long custom and usage 50 -a sort of judicial prescriptive right. No such habit or usage exists with regard to the federal legislative branch; the state legislatures are nowhere directed to
enact local laws similar to those passed in similar matters by Congress.
In a converse situation, an attempt by a state legislature to let Congress and federal administrative boards create regulations for the state
was overthrown, rather indignantly, in Darweger v. Staats.5 1 And it
would seem that Congress, on its part, can hardly allow the local
governments to decide on the applicability of its laws without at least
facing the charge of abdication of its legislative powers.
Another possible approach to the question of the constitutionality
of subsection (j) (3) is from the direction of the sufficiency of the
standards laid down by Congress for guidance of the local units. Pertinent here is the fact that the Illinois district court, in deciding the
case of Woods v. Shoreline Cooperative Apartments, Inc., et al.,5 2 held
the entire "local option" section 53 unconstitutional on the ground that
there were insufficient standards set out for the guidance of the state
and local units. The court, in its opinion, stated: 5 4
It will be noted on reading the local option provisions of this Act that
no standards are set up either for the determination of basic facts or
rules for guidance of the States, municipalities, or other political subdivisions, in determining whether or not -they shall remain under rent
control. As far as Congress is concerned it has attempted to leave the
matter entirely open to arbitrary determination by each State or other
subdivision to decide for itself whether or not it wants rent control, and
this entirely without rules or guide posts of any kind as to whether or
not such rent control may be necessary in connection with the prosecution of the war effort.

Opposed to this view is the subsequent statement in United States v.
Emery et al.,55 by a federal district court in California:
When the Congress authorized cities to recommend decontrol after
hearings, the delegation of power in that respect was no greater than
that given to the advisory committees under the Agricultural Act.
48
49

See Note, 24 ORE. L. Rav. 148 (1945).
U. S. CowsT., Art. 6. cl. 2.

Barnett, Delegation of FederalJurisdiction,43 Amr. L. Rav. 852, 866 (1909).
267 N. Y. 290, 196 N. E. 61 (1935).
52 See note 2 supra.
53 See note 3 supra.
54 See note 2 supra, at 662.
55 See note 5 supra,at 355.
50

51
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Before attempting to evaluate the standards laid down in the Act,
it would be well briefly to examine the various tests for sufficiency of
standards which have been developed by the courts. 56 Early decisions
did not refer to sufficiency of standards as a test of constitutionality,
possibly because they considered that any delegation of congressional
power was invalid. This view was based upon the traditional concept,
as expressed by Locke, that "The legislative cannot transfer the power
of making laws to any other hands, for it being but a delegated power
from the people, they who have it cannot pass it over to others" 57
and upon the maxim delegata potestas non potest delegari.58
The courts in early decisions adopted various refinements of reasoning to uphold what today would, in most cases, realistically be termed a
delegation, valid or invalid. In The Brig Aurora,59 an act of Congress
which made the continued application of an embargo dependent upon the
President's determination of whether Great Britain and France had
ceased to violate the neutral commerce of the United States, was upheld
against the contention that it involved a delegation of legislative
power. The Supreme Court's answer was not direct. Ignoring the
discretionary power delegated, the Court merely stated that Congress
could exercise its discretion in continuing its laws either conditionally
or expressly. A later case upholding a somewhat similar conferring
of power on the President was Field v. Clark.60 That case involved
a congressional act giving the President discretionary power to suspend import duties. The Court decided that there was no delegation
of legislative power, but merely a conferring of authority and discretion to determine when the contingency on which he was directed to
take such action had occurred. In United States v. Grimaud,6' an
act of Congress had given the Secretary of Agriculture power to regulate the use of national forests, and provided that violation of his
regulations was punishable as a crime. It was objected that only Congress could declare what actions should be criminal; but the Supreme
Court, after first affirming a lower court decision holding the act un56 Extensive examination of standards as a test of the constitutionality of
delegation can be found in Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of Legislative Power: II,
47 CoL. L. REv. 561 (1947); Cousens, The Delegation of FederalLegislative Power
to Executive Officials, 33 MxcH. L. REv. 512 (1934); Sternberg, Delegation of Legislative Authority, 11 NoTRE DAum LAwYER 109 (1936). See also Notes, 20 N. Y.
U. L. Q. Ry. 347 (1945); 24 CA=IF. L. Rav. 184 (1935); 7 Miss. L. J. 411 (1935).
5T LocxE, TaaATisE or Civr
GovEmET 95 (Sherman's ed. 1937).
58 A dim view is taken of the maxim's worth in Duff and Whiteside, Delegata
Potestas Non Potest Delegari: A Maxim of American Constitutional Law, 14
CoRN. L. Q. 168, 195 (1929), where the authors opine that the maxim, "kept alive
by discussion and dicta in the earlier cases, rises as a ghost to hamper the efficient
and proper distribution of the functions of government."
59 7 Cranch 382, 3 L. Ed. 379 (U. S. 1813).
60 143 U. S. 649, 12 S. Ct. 495, 36 L. Ed. 294 (1892).
61 220 U. S. 506, 31 S. Ct. 480, 55 L. Ed. 563 (1911).
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constitutional, 62 reversed itself and unanimously held that the act involved only a delegation of administrative authority, and not of legislative power. The Court admitted that "it is difficult to define the line
which separates legislative power to make laws from administrative
regulations." 63 Professor Jaffe, in discussing this admission, comments,
"Difficult indeedl Impossible, if what is meant is a difference in
kind." 64 These cases are cited here to illustrate that the courts for
many years, in considering problems similar to those presented in the
rent control Act, would not construe them as presenting instances
of legislative delegation. Adequate study has been made elsewhere of
the gradual recognition, not yet universal, that constitutionality does
not turn on the question whether there has been a delegation of legislative power, but rather whether such delegation is, in a given case,
valid or invalid. 65 With the adoption of this latter view, implicitly or
explicitly, sufficiency of standards has-become a prime test in the determination of the constitutionality of delegation of Congress' legislative power. Early expressions of what may be called the standards
test were made by Chief Justice Taft in Mahler v. Eby 66 and I. W.
Hampton, Jr. v. United States.61 In the Mahler case, it was stated that
a historical understanding of certain words used by Congress in delegating authority mak give them "the quality of a recognized standard." 68 In the Hampton case, where the President was given power
to adjust tariff rates, a definite test was stated: "If Congress shall lay
down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or
body authorized to fix such rates is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power." 69
That very broad powers may be delegated where standards are deemed sufficiently definite is attested by the existence and scope of operation of such governmental agencies as the National Labor Relations
Board, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Power
Commission, the Federal Communications Commission and the Interstate Commerce Commission, to name but a few. An examination of
a few World War II cases involving the broad delegation of Congress'
war powers will serve as concrete examples of what the Supreme Court
has recently approved as sufficiently. definite standards. In Yakus v.
United States,70 involving the constitutionality of price controls under
62 216 U. S. 614, 30 S. Ct. 576, 54 L. Ed. 639 (1910).
63 See note 61 supra, 220 U. S. at 517.
64 Jaffe, supra note 56, at 567.

65 E.g., Jaffe, supra note 56, see also State ex rel. Wisconsin Inspection Bureau et al. v. Whitman, 196 Wis. 472, 220 N. W. 929, 93742 (1928).
66 264 U. S. 32, 44 S. Ct. 283, 68 L. Ed. 549 (1924).
67 276 U. S. 394,45 S. Ct. 348, 72 L. Ed. 624 (1928).

68 See note 66 supra, 264 U. S. at 40.
69

See note 67 supra, 276 U. S. at 409.

70

321 U. S. 414, 64 S. Ct. 660, 88 L. Ed. 834 (1944).
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the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, the Court summarized the
standards laid down to guide the Price Administrator in the following
manner: "that the prices fixed shall be fair and equitable, that in addition they shall tend to promote the purposes of the Act, and that in
promulgating them consideration shall be given to prices prevailing in
a stated base period. . .. ,,71 These standards were upheld by the
Court as sufficiently definite. In Bowles v. Willingham, 72 in which the
rent control section of the Emergency Price Control Act was challenged, a similar standard by which administrative action was to be guided
was upheld. The Court in this decision stated: 73
'Congress does not abdicate its functions when it describes what job
must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his authority ...
Whether a particular grant of authority to an officer or agency is wise or
unwise, raise questions which are none of our concern.
Finally, under the Housing and Rent Act of 1947, the Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of the delegation of authority to the Hous74
ing Expediter, in the case of Woods v. Miller, saying: 75
Under the present Act the Housing Expediter is authorized to remove
the rent controls in any defense-rental area if in his judgment the need
no longer exists by reason of new construction or satisfaction of demand
in other ways. The powers thus delegated are far less extensive than
those sustained in Bowles v. Willingham . . . Nor is there here a grant
of unbridled discretion. The standards prescribed pass muster under our
decisions.
There is, however, a limit to the generality of standards which Congress may prescribe, beyond which it may not go without the attempted
delegation being struck down. Under the provisions of the National
Industrial Recovery Act, section 9(c),76 the President was authorized
to prohibit transportation in interstate commerce of petroleum in excess of amounts permitted under state laws or regulations. The Act
did not define the cirmustances and conditions under which the President was to allow or prohibit such transportation. An introductory
section of the Act declared that there was a national emergency and
that it was the policy of Congress to eliminate unfair competition and
to conserve natural resources.
In Panama Refining Company v.
Ryan,77 section 9(c) was held to be an unconstitutional delegation of
power. The Court stated, "If section 9(c) were held valid, it would be
idle to pretend that anything would be left of limitations upon the
power of the Congress to delegate its lawmaking function." 78
71

321 U. S. at 427.

72 321 U. S. 503, 64 S.Ct. 641, 88 L. Ed. 892 (1944).
73 321 U. S. at 515.
74 333 U. S. 138, 68 S.Ct. 421, 92 L. Ed. 596 (1948).
75 333 U. S. at 144-S.
78 48 STAT. 200 (1933).
77 293 U. S. 388, 55 S. Ct. 241, 79 L. Ed. 446 (1935).
78 293 U. S. at 430.
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In A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corporationet al. v. United States,7 9
certain other provisions of the N.I.R.A. were declared to be an unconstitutional delegation because of lack of sufficient standards. The Court
construed these provisions as authorizing the President to approve or
prescribe through codes of fair competition, prohibitions which the
President and the formulators of such codes deemed wise and beneficial measures for governing trades and industries, so as to bring about
industrial recovery and rehabilitation. The Court, in striking down
these provisions, said: 80
But Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the President to
exercise an unfettered discretion to make whatever laws he thinks may be
needed or advisable for the rehabilitation of trade or industry.

Finally, in the case of Carter v. Carter Coal Company,8 ' the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act 82 was struck down, as an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power. The Act provided, in part, that a majority of the producers and miners were to be allowed to fix maximum
hours and minimum wages. The Court did not discuss standards, but
its holding would seem to imply that it could find no sufficient standards in the Act, and it termed the delegation "clearly arbitrary." 83
With these cases in mind, the question may be considered whether,
under subsection 20"4 (j) (3) of the Housing and Rent Act of 1949, there
are sufficient standards set forth by which the delegation to the local
governmental units could be sustained. This subsection, it will be recalled, allows local governing units to hold public hearings and adopt,
under local laws, resolutions that there no longer exists such a rental
housing shortage as to require rent control in the particular city, town
or village. Furthermore, such resolutions are only to be effective if
approved by the Governor. Does the failure of Congress to suggest to
the Governor and the local bodies, as it did suggest to the Housing Expediter,8 4 reasons upon which to base their determination of whether
rent control has become unnecessary, cause the subsection to be invalid
for lack of standards? The Illinois district court, in deciding the Shoreline case,8 5 could find no standards whatever in this subsection, stating: 86
No standard is laid down as to what is or what is not a shortage of
rental housing accommodations, nor is there any provision as to the
procedure for or findings at a public hearing or how that public hearing
is to reach any conclusion upon the question of whether or not rent control is no longer necessary or desirable.
79

80
81
82

295 U. S. 495, 55 S. Ct. 837, 79 L. Ed. 570 (1935).
295 U. S. at 537-8.
See note 39 supra.
49 STAT. 991 (1935).

83

See note 39 supra, 298 U. S. at 311.
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See note 18 supra.

85 See note 2 supra.
88 See note 2 supra,at 663.
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It is interesting to note, on the other hand, that the California district
court, in upholding the constitutionality of the Act, made no mention
of the question of standards.
It seems clear that no definite line can be drawn between what constitutes sufficient standards and what standards are insufficient. There
is a broad twilight zone within which it is impossible to predict the outcome of the question of sufficiency of standards in advance of judicial
determination. Perhaps the ultimate test as to sufficiency is contained
in the decision of the relatively early case of Buttfield v. Stranahan,8 7
where the Court concluded that "Congress legislated on the subject as
far as was reasonably practicable." 88 In any event, it is suggested by
an examination of the cases that the ultimate resolution of the problem
may lie in the facts and circumstances of the individual case. It has
been said that a doctrine limiting delegation ".

.

. is intelligible only in

terms of the degree of delegation which the judiciary regards as appropriate in the circumstances." 89
III.

Should one or more of the "local option" provisions of the Housing
and Rent Act be held unconstitutional, the question will remain whether
the separability clause can be given effect, so as to uphold the remaining parts of the Act. The separability clause states: 90
If any provision of this Act or the application of such provision to
any person or circumstances shall be held invalid, the validity of the
remainder of the Act, and the applicability of such provisions to other
persons or circumstances, shall not be affected thereby.

It is generally accepted that there are two basic tests which must be
satisfied if the parts of an act are to be considered separable. First, it
must appear from an examination of legislative intent that the statute
was intended to be separable; secondly, the act must be capable, as a
practical matter, of effecive operation without the severed portion. 91
Where no separability clause is included, the presumption is that the
statute was intended to be indivisible; the inclusion of a separability
clause has the effect of reversing this presumption. 92 It might seem at
first blush that the inclusion of a separability clause should be conclusive as to congressional intent. However, indiscriminate use of the
separability clause has weakened its evidentiary effect. It has been
suggested, as a remedy for this situation, that such clauses set out spe87 192 U. S.470, 24 S. Ct. 349, 48 L. Ed. 525 (1904).
88 192 U. S. at 496.
89 Jaffe, note 56 supra, at 581.

90 See note 4 supra.
SuTHEm Am), STATuTORY CoNsmuciON § 2403 (3d ed. 1943).
92 Williams v. Standard Oil Company, 278 U. S. 235, 49 S.Ct. 115, 73 L. Ed.
287 (1929) ; Carter v. Carter Coal Company, supra note 39.
91
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cifically the portions of an act which are intended to be separable, 93
and this procedure has been adopted in at least one instance.9 4
There would seem to be little argument but that the Housing and
Rent Act could operate effectively if the "local option" provisions were
severed from the remaining portion of the Act, since the remainder would
be substantially the same as the original 1947 Act and its 1948 amendment. Consequently, the important remaining question is whether an
examination of the Act's legislative history reveals congressional intent
that the Act be separable. In refusing to give effect to the separability
clause, the Illinois district court stated in the Shoreline case: 95
...it is entirely clear from all the sources available, including the debateg in Congress, that the Act could never have passed without the
local option provisions. They were the means principally relied upon'
as a way of returning the Government to the States and subdivisions
immediately. Without these provisions there would be no way of de-

controlling an area except through the powers given the administrator,
and it is entirely clear from the local option provisions themselves that
Congress did not consider those administrative means as adequate for
accomplishing its declared purpose . . . It is my opinion that the unconstitutional portions of this Act, if considered with its preamble, greatly
outweigh all of the other provisions for decontrol.

An examination: of the legislative history of the Act, and of its preamble, does not seem to preclude the possibility for a conclusion as to
congressional intent opposite to that arrived at by the Illinois court.
The preamble does, indeed, as mentioned by the Illinois district court,
state the congressional policy that federal rent control should end at
the earliest practicable date. However, it should not be overlooked
that the preamble also states that ". . . it is necessary for a limited
time to impose certain restrictions upon rents charged for rental housing accommodations in defense rental areas." 96 Furthermore, the preamble is the same one which appeared in the original 1947 Act, and
thus would not seem to have any particular significance with respect
to the "local option" provisions of the recent Act.
The Illinois district court felt constrained, under the authority of
the Carter Coal Company case, to hold that the Housing and Rent Act
was not separable. HoWever, the Carter Coal Company case was decided largely on the basis that the provisions of the Act there in question
were not separable because of their basic interdependence. Since, as
pointed out above, the separability of the Housing and Rent Act, from
the point of view of its possibilities for practical and effective operation
after separation, does not seem to be much in question, the Carter Coal
98 Stern, Separability and Separabilty Clauses, 51 HEnv. L. Rxv. 76, 125
(1937).
94 Connally Hot Oil Act, 49 STAT. 30, 15 U. S. C.§ 7M5c (1946).
95 See note 2 supra, at 666.
98 See note 21 supra.
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Company case would not seem to be controlling authority; the separability question in regard to the recent rent control Act is largely one
of congressional intent.
A great deal of the Senate and House debate on the proposed Act
did revolve about the "local option" provisions, and this would seem 9to7
indicate that great importance was attached to these parts of the Act.
However, it seems quite natural that a major addition to an existing
law should be debated at length, and that the provisions which had been
in force under the previous Act should receive comparatively less attention. Also, the continued power of decontrol in the Housing Expediter- would seem to indicate that Congress intended the two systems
of decontrol to operate side by side.98 In addition, there was considerable evidence in committee reports and in congressional debate of
recognition of the fact that continued controls at the national level
were necessary in many areas.9 9
Ultimately, it must be said that, just as in the question of sufficiency
of standards, there exists considerable judicial leeway in determining
the issue of separability. At least one prominent writer has concluded,
after an examination of the cases involving separability, that ". . the
Court is free to decide each case the way it pleases without having its
discretion fettered by any restraining doctrine," 100 and further that
"... in important cases judicial decisions on separability often reflect
the attitude of the judges towards the merits of the particular statute. .. ," 101

Conclusions
The problem of delegation of legislative authority under the Housing
and Rent Act, and the effect to be given the separability clause, will not
be facilely resolved. An attempt has been made herein to suggest some
of the possible avenues of approach in determining whether all or part
of the Act should be upheld. The effects on the national economy of a
general and instantaneous removal of rent controls would seem to be an
important policy consideration in arriving at a solution to these problems, 102 in view of the still prevalent shortage of rental housing units.' 03
See generally issues of Cong. Rec. cited in notes 45-47 supra.
95 Cong. Rec. 2521-3 (Mar. 15, 1949); 95 Cong. Rec. 2982 (Mar. 22,
1949) ; 95 Cong. Rec. 3404 (Mar. 29, 1949).
99 SmT. RE.P. No. 127, 81st Cong., Ist Sess. (1949) (introductory portion);
95 Cong. Rec. 2871, 2873, 2876, 2884, 2891 (Mar. 21, 1949).
100 Stem, note 93 supra, at 111.
101 Stern, note 93 supra, at 114.
102 A letter from the Housing Expediter, Tighe E. Woods, informed the
97
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writers that, as of October 12, 1949, a number of properly approved decontrol resolutions had been received pursuant to the "local option" provisions of the Act, as
follows: section 204 (j) (1), one; section 204 (j) (2), two; section 204 (j) (3),
184. From these figures it would not appear that there has been any wholesale

NOTES
The purely legal implications, especially the problem of delegation,
and the various considerations arising in its determination, provide a
fertile, if somewhat involved, ground upon which to speculate. Determination of the validity of the Act in question, involving as it does the
added feature of delegation to state and local authorities instead of to
federally constituted administrative agents, will be of importance far
beyond the question of rent control's continued existence. The influence of the decision made by the Supreme Court in this case will be
felt in any congressional consideration of the advisability of utilizing
the state and local government in future pieces of legislation. Also, the
Court may resolve some of the confusion which now surrounds the use
of terminology in the question of delegation, the uncertainty as to what
constitutes sufficient standards, and the effect of a standard separability
clause.
John F. Bodle
E. A. Stei6fn, Jr.

Constitutional Law,

Tim TEmrNmLLo CASE: AN EXTENSION

OR AN ABUSE OF TnE

CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER CONCEPT?
To find the starting point for the reognition of the right of free
speech in American constitutional history would be a difficult if not
an impossible task. This right was accepted by political philosophers
as a principle of constitutional governmeit long before the United
States was founded; yet, never was it given the breadth of importance
which the early American colonists imported to it. Philosophically
speaking, freedom of speech arises from the very nature of man, and
although some would deny this, that principle remains immutably true.
Its ramifications are so complex as to defy the possibility of proper
legislative restraint, yet these natural rights require some limitation
in their individual exercise, for liberty is not license. In a study of the
theories of this dilemma the following will be discussed: the recent
case of Terminiello v. City of Chicago;' the rationale of Mr. Justice
Jackson's dissent in that case; the historical development of freedom
of speech; and the modem Court and free speech. In the past, the
move toward decontrol, especially at the state level. This would seem to be evidence of the fact that the continued need for rent control in many localities is
widely recognized, and that there is a general unwillingness to risk the economic
repercussions which might be caused by ending rent controls.
103 See note 99 suPla.
1 ....U.S....., 69 S. Ct. 894 (1949).
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attitude of the Court toward this right has been one of vacillation
and has resulted in confusion. Recent cases indicate that the dilemma
is yet to be resolved.
I.

In the latest decision involving free speech, the United States
Supreme Court, in the Terminiello case, reversed the conviction of
Arthur Terminiello, a Catholic priest then under suspension by his
Bishop, for causing a breach of the peace. The breach was occasioned
by an impassioned address given by Terminiello before a meeting
arranged by Gerald L. K. Smith. There was a capacity crowd of many
hundreds inside the auditorium in Chicago where the address was
delivered, while outside the auditorium there was a larger crowd protesting the meeting. Many policemen were assigned to maintain order,
but they were unable to prevent rock throwing, fights and disturbances.
Terminiello vehemently criticized various political and racial groups
during his address. After the meeting, he was charged with disorderly
conduct in violation of a Chicago ordinance.2 In the trial court, a jury
found him guilty of the charge and imposed a fine of $100. Terminiello
took a direct appeal to the state supreme court. The cause was transferred to a state appellate court, which affirmed the decision of the
trial court. 3 The Illinois Supreme Court allowed a petition for leave
to appeal and, by a unanimous decision, affirmed the conviction upon
the theory that Terminiello's remarks were "fighting words," and thus
passed beyond the reasonable limits of free speech and constituted an
abuse of the right, and that therefore his conviction and punishment
did not constitute an abridgement of constitutional guarantees nor
present a constitutional question for decision by the court.4 The argument of Terminiello before the state courts was that the ordinance
as applied to his conduct violated his right to free speech under the
Federal Constitution. The United States Supreme Court allowed certiorari and, in a five-to-four opinion, reversed the conviction. The
majority opinion stated that it was unnecessary, to decide whether the
personal insults and abuse which Terminiello hurled to the eager audience constituted "fighting words," although that was the theory of
the case below and the argument before the Supreme Court. Rather,
the case was decided upon the preliminary question of the constitutionality of the Chicago ordinance as construed by the trial court.
2 "All persons who shall make, aid, countenance, or assist in making any improper noise, riot, disturbance, breach of the peace, or diversion tending to a
breach of the peace within the limits of the city... shall be deemed guilty of disorderly conduct, and upon conviction thereof, shall be severally fined not less than
one dollar nor more than two hundred dollars for each offense." Rv. CODE § I
(1) Ch. 193, City of Chicago (1939).
3 332 I1.App. 17, 74 N. E. (2d) 45 (1947).
4 396 M. 41, 71 N. E. (2d) 2 (1947); 400 Ill. 23, 79 N. E. (2d) 39 (1948).

NOTES
The trial court had instructed the jury that a "breach of peace" consisted of "any misbehavior which violates the public peace and
decorum" and that the "misbehavior may constitute -a breach of the
peace if it stirs the public to anger, invites dispute, brings about
a condition of unrest, or creates a disturbance, or if it molests the
inhabitants in the enjoyment of peace and quiet by arousing alarm." 5
The Court said that this construction by the trial court as to what
constituted a breach was as much a part of the ordinance as if it had
been written into the ordinance by amendment, and was binding upon
the Court. The Court reiterated the value of free discussion in our
democratic system, and concluded that the ordinance as construed
was an invasion of the province of free discussion, in that it would
prohibit some of the most important functions of free speech; e.g.,
to invite dispute, bring about a condition of unrest, or stir the public
to anger. Justice Douglas, writing the majority opinion, then applied
the test of clear and present danger, saying: 6
That is why freedom of speech, though not absolute

. . .

is never-

theless protected against censorship or punishment, unless shown likely
to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that
rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest . . . There
is no room under our Constitution for a more .restrictive view. For the
alternative would lead to standardization of ideas either by legislatures,

courts, or dominant political or community groups.
Despite the failure of Terminiello to object to the instruction given
by the trial court, Justice Douglas declared that the constitutionality
of the ordinance as construed and applied was before the Illinois
courts. In so stating, the Court relied on the authority of Stromberg v.
California7 and refused to "strain at technicalities." The ordinance
as construed and applied was held to contain parts that were unconsttutional, and, since the verdict below was general, the conviction
was reversed.
Chief Justice Vinson dissented on procedural grounds. He deplored
the proposition, apparently adopted by the majority, that the state
courts in affirming a conviction approve of every unnoticed and unobjected-to error which may be discovered in the record by the Supreme
Court. He argued that the issue presented below and in the oral
arguments before the Supreme Court was that of "fighting words."
The Chief Justice stated that he would have agreed with the majority
decision if the issue of the constitutionality of the ordinance as construed by the trial court's charge to the jury had been presented in
proper form below and upon appeal.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote a vigorous dissent based principally
upon his disagreement as to the authority of the Court to make a
5 See note 1 supra.
8 Id. at 896.
7 283 U. S. 359, 51 S. Ct. 532, 75 L. Ed. 1117 (1931).
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departure from the accepted principles of review of state court decisions
which had prevailed for the past 13a years. He took issue with the
majority's reliance upon the Stromberg case as authorizing this procedural innovation, and distinguished the two cases on the facts, pointing out that the petitioner in the Stromberg case had made constitutional objections in proper form in the lower courts. Frankfurter
asserted that no such objections were made in the Terminiello case.
The Stromberg case resembled the Terminiello case in that the charge
in each case was based on a statute or ordinance containing several
provisions upon which conviction was possible. In each case, the
Supreme Court held at least one of these provisions unconstitutional.
In both cases, the statute or ordinance contained both valid and
invalid parts. Since the verdicts in the lower courts were both general,
it was impossible for the Court to assume that the conviction in either
case had been upon the valid parts of the charge. Another reason for
Frankfurter's dissent was his assertion that the Terminiello case involved a civil, not a criminal proceeding and was for that reason
subject only to limited review.
II.
In a lengthy and astute dissent, Mr. Justice Jackson lashed out
at the majority, not only for their holding in the case, but for adding
to the many impediments with which the states are already burdened
in the exercise of their police power. 8 In addition, he deplored the
Court's action in deciding the case upon a question of law not spacifically pleaded in either the lower courts or upon appeal to the
Supreme Court. He reprimanded the majority for their seemingly
"absolutist" philosophy of free speech, citing numerous cases and
circumstances wherein the Court has seriously restricted the states'
power to cope with these problems locally. He went 'to great length
to point out the vileness of Terminiello's speech, and the manner in
which it was delivered, quoting excerpts from it for several pages. He
inferred that the words were stimulants to an already uneasy mob
which had assembled to protest the meeting. He pointed out that the
hatred which merges the many minds of a crowd into the mindlessness
of a mob almost invariably is supplied by speeches. A cursory glance
at the epithets spewed forth by Terminiello brings to light the truthfulness of this observation. In fact, the speech was little more than a
collection of thinly veiled insults of a discriminatory nature and were
directed at various racial and political groups.9
In further support of his argument, Jackson cited the many ways
in which the courts have restricted the power of the states and munici8

See note 1

69 S. (t. at 907.
-U-ra,

9 Id. at 901-04.
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palities to cope with these problems. He pointed out that the lower
court had not indulged in theory; it had dealt with a riot, and with
a speech that provoked a hostile mob and incited a friendly one.' 0
Furthermore, it was pointed out that streets and parks maintained
by the public cannot be denied to groups for the communication of
ideas; cities may, however, protect their streets from activities which
the law has always regarded -s subject to control, such as nuisances.
Picketing is largely immune from control on the ground that it involves
free speech, and the state may not regulate sound trucks and loud
speakers, though the Court has regarded them as an evil that may
be prohibited altogether." Mr. Justice Jackson recalled the classic
statement of Mark Anthony in Julius Caesar,12 after he had addressed
the Romans: "Trouble thou art afoot, take thou what course thou
wilt." The cases Mr. Justice Jackson cited as limiting the ability of
the states and cities to restrict civil rights seem not to be exactly in
point. Most of the cases which he cited concern not freedom of speech
alone but, in addition, freedom of assembly, which although in the
category of civil rights, is in itself a distinct right, being of a more
positive nature and more dangerous when abused than free speech.' 3
Speech alone, without assembly, cannot produce violence. It was the
assembly of pickets outside the building who protested the meeting
that gave the final motion to the mob madness. Terminiello's audience
did not come to the meeting to protest his activities, but to hear him
speak. Lawful as it may have been for the pickets to assemble outside the building to protest against this meeting, the Constitution provides only for peaceable assembly. 14 Their protest could have been
carried out just as effectively through peaceful means as through violent disturbances, and this would have been a democratic people's
answer to Terminiello. The First and Fourteenth Amendments protect
the citizen only from suffering legal consequences at the hands of
government authorities acting under color of the law. They do not,
and cannot, protect the citizen against the social consequences of exercising his legal privilege to say what he pleases. Every citizen of the
United States has the privilege of standing on a soapbox and expounding
peculiar ideas if he wishes; but he need not expect the Constitution
30
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11 Id. at 907.

Julius Caesar, Act III, sc. 2.
Hague v. C. I. 0., 307 U. S. 496, 59 S. Ct. 954, 83 L. Ed. 1423 (1939);
Jamison v. Texas, 318 U. S. 413, 63 S. Ct. 669, 671, 87 L. Ed. 896 (1943); Douglas v. Jeanette, 319 U. S. 157, 63 S. Ct. 877, 87 L. Ed. 1324 (1943) ; Saia v. New
York, 334 U. S. 558, 68 S. Ct. 1148, 92 L. Ed. 1324 (1947).
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to protect him against the unpleasant social consequences of being
regarded as a peculiar person.
Mr. Justice Jackson also disputed the Court's usurpation of authority in, this and similar cases involving the First and Fourteenth Amendments. He referred to the scope allowed free speech prior to 1922 and
its freedom from state control; its subsequent limitation, even under
Holmes and Brandeis, in Prudential InsuranceCo. v. Cheek,15 and the
shift of dogma by the present Court in the protection of that speech.
Although he does not quarrel with this shift of dogma, he asserts that
the right to limit the state's attempts to restrict free speech is derived
only from the Court's own assumption of power. He considers it an
exercise of self-given, unappealable power. Further, he states, the
terms of the Fourteenth Amendment gave no notice to the people that
its adoption would strip their local governments of power to deal with
such problems of local peace and order as are involved here. 16 Justice
Holmes answered this question as to the inclusion of a restriction upon
the power of a state within the realm of the Fourteenth Amendment
in his dissent in Gitlow v. New York.17 He stated there that the
general principle of free speech must be taken to be included in the
Fourteenth Amendment in view of the scope that has been given, to
the word "liberty" as there used.' 8 He suggested that, in the case of
the states, it may be given a somewhat larger latitude of interpretation
than is allowed to Congress by the sweeping language that governs, or
ought to govern, the laws of the United States.
Mr. Justice Jackson would not follow the majority in presuming
any statute to be invalid which, upon its face, restricts civil liberties,
until circumstances are shown which would justify or make obvious
the necessity of such a restriction. Although not adhering to the view
of Mr. Justice Frankfurter that there is a legal presumption that the
legislature is the only body capable of dealing with a problem such
as this, he would give a somewhat wider scope to the police powers
of the state. The choice, he says, is between liberty with order on the
one hand, and anarchy without either liberty or order on the other,
which is a slogan, not a solution to such a complex problem as this.
Aside from this, it should be pointed out that Mr. Justice Jackson
has attempted to assume a realistic attitude toward this dilemma of
free speech, for in the usual case involving that concept, the party
15 259 U. S. 530, 52 S. Ct. 516, 66 L. Ed. 1044 (1922).
16 See note 1 supra, 69 S. Ct. at 907.
17 268 U. S. 652, 45 S. Ct. 625, 69 L. Ed. 1138 (1925).
18 U. S. CONSr. AmED. XIV. The word liberty in this amendment was held
to include freedom of speech in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 45 S. Ct. 625,
69 L. Ed. 1138 (1925); freedom of the press in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S.
697, 51 S. Ct. 625, 75 L. Ed. 1357 (1931); peaceful assembly in Dejong v. Oregon,
299 U. S. 353, 57 S. Ct. 255, 81 L. Ed. 278 (1937); free exercise of religion in
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 319 U. S. 296, 60 S. Ct. 900, 84 L. Ed. 1213 (1940).
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asserting this fundamental right is offensive because of his espousal
of a political philosophy utterly opposed to that of the majority. Few
can exonerate themselves from this charge of intolerance. It is not
easy to detest an extremist philosophy and yet insist on the right of
any man to advocate it freely.
Terminiello need not have been a prophet to realize the consequences of his actions, yet it was the attitude of those who came
to protest his speech that should have been, restrained, it would seem,
rather than Terminiello's speech. To say that, morally speaking, the
speech ought not to have been made is to belabor the obvious, but
to say that a speech of this sort should be legally prohibited might
conceivably commit us to a philosophy repugnant to our form of government. hi the words of Thomas Jefferson: 19
If there be any among us who wish to dissolve this union, or to
change its republican form, let them stand undisturbed, as monuments
to the safety with which error of opinion may be tolerated where reason
is left free to combat it.

Certainly Mr. Justice Holmes had these words of Jefferson in mind
when he stated that "if there is any principle of the Constitution that
more imperatively calls for attachment than any other it is the principle of free thought-not free thought for those who agree with us,
but freedom for the thought that we hate." 20 The importance of
the many problems involved in the Terminielto case, and the confusion caused thereby, would appear to render a brief review of
applicable constitutional history beneficial at this point.
m.
Early English law contained no protection for freedom of speech
and 'the press in the sense in which we understand the right today.
That is to say, there was no right to criticize the sovereign, the government or those holding public office, no matter how true the strictures
might be, and no matter how proper might be the motives of the person
publishing them. Legal recognition of real freedom of speech and press
was not attained until well after the "Glorious Revolution" of 1688,
for until that time the crown assumed the prerogative of regulating
its exercise, and a breach of this regulation resulted in severe penalties. 2 This regulation was carried out by the notorious Star Chamber,
often to the point of judicially inflicted torture. 22 Publications were
licensed and restricted under government censorship, and it was against
aDO or SPrac
19 Jefferson's First Innaugural Address, cited in CHkz=, FR
161 (1st ed. 1920).
20 See United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U. S. 644, 655, 49 S. Ct. 448, 73
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this that Milton wrote his famous Areopagitica in 1644.23 The crimes
of seditious libel and seditious speech were developed in all their
rigor by the Star Chamber, which dispensed justice without a jury.
This authority was later exercised by the Court of King's Bench, sitting with a jury; but following the precedents of the Star Chamber,
little scope was allowed to the jury in deciding the case. The truth
of the words was no defense. Lack of intent to stir up disorder or
to induce a breach of law, or the fact that the 2words
in question had
4
no such tendency, were also of no consequence.
The Constitution of the United States, as originally adopted, contained nothing on the subject of freedom of speech or of the press.
Clauses to the effect that liberty of speech and press should be inviolably preserved or observed were proposed in the Constitutional
Convention, but were deemed unnecessary, since the Constitution was
considered a grant of powers to the Federal Government, and matters
over which regulatory power was not granted could not be governed
or restrained by it.235 The importance of freedom of speech was recognized very early by the American colonists. Every student of American
colonial history will remember the trial and acquittal of John Peter
Zenger on charges of seditious libel.2 6 Following Mason's Virginia
Constitution of 1776; declarations of the right of free speech found
their way into other state constitutions. The people's recognition of
the need is shown by the failure of adoption of the Massachusetts
Constitution of 1778 because of the failure to include a provision for
freedom of discussion.2 7 In fulfillment of the understanding upon
which a number of state conventions had ratified the Federal Constitution, the Bill of Rights was submitted to the people of the states.
Included therein was the First Amendment, which was adopted in 1791.
It provided that, "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom
of speech or of the press." 28
The issues of free speech were raised dramatically in the period
following the passage of the Alien and Sedition Laws of 1798.29 These
laws were passed by the Federalist-dominated Congress prompted by
fears of the spread of foreign revolutionary doctrine, and severely punished writings defamatory of the Government. These acts were later
vindicated as being "part of a general system of defense, adapted to
the crisis of extraordinary difficulty and danger." 80 A majority of the
23
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state legislatures supported the position taken by Congress.3 1 In theory
at least, the measures were repudiated by Thomas Jefferson who, upon
being elected to the presidency, pardoned all persons convicted under
them. He was of the opinion that such restrictions as these should be
left to the states and not to the Federal Government.8 2 He based
this opinion on the specific prohibitions against congressional action
contained in the First Amendment. Since the Court now considers the
concept of free speech to be incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment,3 the logical result of Jefferson's contention would be that since
Congress cannot make any laws abridging freedom of speech, neither
can the states; but, for the purpose of carrying out the ministerial
duties of government, certain restrictions may be laid down for the
protection of that function by Congress, and by the states. The Supreme
Court clarified this point somewhat when it said:3 4
...the First Amendment while prohibiting legislation against free speech
as such, cannot have been and obviously was not, intended to give immunity for every possible use of language . . . We venture to believe

that neither Hamilton nor Madison, nor any other competent person
then or later, ever supposed that to make criminal the counseling of a,
murder within the jurisdiction of Congress would be an unconstitutional
interference with free speech.

Sound thinking on the subject of free speech is often impeded by
attitudes which are the product of conditions of the past. Because our
pioneer forefathers needed but little that government could provide,
they could afford to insist on a high degree of freedom from control
simply because they did not like to take orders. At a time and amid
conditions wherein the well-being of the people demands freedom within
reason, we must seek deeper for the criteria of freedom of speech than
our own individual dislikes, for society today is much more complex
and requires a certain amount of limitation on those freedoms for the
good of all. Sweeping as is the language of these constitutional guarantees, they are not to be interpreted as absolutes. It is the purpose
of this article to seek out the criteria (if such there be) for valid
limitations on free speech as defined by our courts in their treatment
of this problem. The scope of freedom of speech under our constitutional system is so broad that this resum6 has been prepared with an
eye only to the cases which have resulted in the formation of a new
concept, or the novel application of such concept, in the process of
testing the availability of constitutional safeguards for the type of
speech involved in the particular case.
31 Ibid.
See note 25 supra.
88 See note 18 supra.
84 Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U. S. 204, 206, 39 S. Ct. 249, 63 L. Ed.
561 (1919).
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The era of the First World War produced the Espionage Act of
1917 85 and the Sedition Act of 1918.8 6 These laws were almost on
a par with the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, and resulted in the
prosecution of nearly 2000 persons for radical utterances. The courts
were handicapped in their treatment of these cases by the lack of
controlling precedents. For example, Judge Learned Hand went to
the writings of Milton and John Stuart Mill for principles of free
speech. Judge Hand developed an objective test as to the limits of
free speech which might have enabled the courts to handle the prosecutions for abuses of this right during the era of World War I with
a greater degree of fairness than in fact resulted. This very capable
judge placed outside the permissible limits of speech one who counsels
or advises others to violate existing laws. To be beyond the scope of
constitutional protection, one must have urged others that it was their
duty or to their interest to resist the law. This test is very close to
the common law rules applying to solicitation and attempt. Professor
Chaffee, in 1920, asserted that there was no finer judicial statement
of the right of free speech than these words of Judge Hand:3 7
Political agitation, by the passions it arouses or the convictions it
engenders, may in fact stimulate men to the violation of law. Detesta,
tion of existing policies is easily transformed into forcible resistance of
authority which puts them in execution, and it would be folly to disregard the causal relation between the two. Yet to assimilate agitation,
legitimate as such, with direct incitement to violent resistance, is to
disregard the tolerance of all methods of political agitation which in normal times is a safeguard of free government. The distinction is not a
scholastic subterfuge, but a hard-bought acquisition in the fight for
freedom....

Blackstone's idea of freedom of speech 88 had been pretty well
repudiated by the time of World War I,89 but it was to be resurrected
35
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40
and accepted by the majority of the Court in Near v. Minnesota.
This test, although narrow and incomplete in the modem sense, does
state the guarantees afforded by the First Amendment. A second
interpretation of the freedom of speech clauses limits them to the
protection of the "use" of utterance and not its "abuse." This test
draws the line between "liberty" and "license." It was applied in
Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States.4 1 The Blackstonian test of
"no previous restraint" and the later test distinguishing between liberty
and license, were abandoned in favor of the tests supplied by Justices
Brandeis and Holmes, and more immediately, by the confused test
adopted by the majority of the Court during the period of the HolmesBrandeis dissents.
The majority view of the Court was a twofold bne during this time.
Constitutional authorities agree that the Court was not applying the
test of a "clear and present danger," either in theory or in name, during this period, with the notable exception of Sckenck v. United
States,4 2 in which the test was first applied. This case resulted in a
conviction anyway, which may in part explain the acquiescence of the
majority. For the next eighteen years, the majority ignored the "clear
and present danger" test, and, it would appear, decided many cases of
this type by applying the principles of "indirect causation," and "constructive intent." Under the theory of "indirect causation," words
can be punished for their supposed "bad tendency," long before the
probability arises that they will result in unlawful acts. The "constructive intent" theory provided that the only intent the defendant
must have had was the intent to write or speak the words he did in
fact write or speak. If the words had a "bad tendency," it was presumed that the consequences of the acts were intended. The HolmesBrandeis doctrine was a "middle way" between the extreme view of the
majority and the objective test of Judge Hand. In laying down the
"clear and present danger" test in the Sckenck case, Justice Holmes
stated: 43 "... the question in every case is whether the words used
are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create
a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive
evils that Congress has a right to prevent." He went on to explain that
it was a question of proximity and degree. From the date of that case
until the present time, the rule as above stated has meant many things
39 For cases expressly repudiating the Blackstonian doctrine of free speech,
see Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47, 39 S. Ct. 247, 63 L. Ed. 470 (1919);
State v. McKee, 73 Conn. 18, 46 At. 409 (1900); State v. Pioneer Press Co.,
100 Minn. 173, 110 N.W. 867 (1907); Cowan v. Fairbrother, 118 N. C. 406, 24
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40 283 U. S. 697, 51 S.Ct. 625, 75 L. Ed. 1367 (1931).
41 247 U. S. 402, 419, 38 S.Ct. 560, 62 L. Ed. 1186 (1918).
42 249 U. S. 47, 39 S.Ct. 247, 63 L. Ed. 470 (1919).
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to many judges. From the decision in the Schenck case until 1937, it
was the minority view of the Court. During this period, Mr. Justice
Brandeis, who was even more liberal in these cases than Holmes, insisted
that the incidence of the evil apprehended by the words used must be
so imminent that it might befall before there was opportunity for full
discussion. This added some clarity to the test, but it remained a
vague one at best. Brandeis also suggested (and it was the first time
that the possibility had been advanced by any member of the Supreme
Court) in Gilbert v. Minnesota,44 that free speech was within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. Hughes and Stone, both great
defenders of the right of free speech, were content in large part to decide these cases on the basis of "due process" and did not rely upon the
hazy "clear and present danger" test.
The next important step taken by the Court was the acceptance of
the view of Brandeis that freedom of speech was within the purview of
the Fourteenth Amendment. It was not until 1925, in the Gitlow case,
that the Court "assumed" that the right of free speech was included
within that Amendment. In both the Stromberg and the Near cases,
the Court expressly decided that state enactments depriving a person
of the right freely to speak or publish his sentiments concerning the
government and its officers are invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment. In Herndon v. Lowry,45 the Court finally accepted the "clear
and present danger" doctrine as its advocates had intended it.
IV
To the layman and to many lawyers, the decisions of the Supreme
Court in civil liberty cases in the past decade must present an irresolvable paradox. In matters of freedom of speech the present members
of the Court are, in a sense, following the judicial philosophy of
Holmes. As the division in the Court would well indicate, they have
two basically different interpretations of this philosophy. It will be remembered that it was Holmes who spent nearly a lifetime on the bench
developing the doctrine of judicial restraint as to legislation. That is to
say, his basic philosophy concerning matters of judicial review was that
the decisions of the legislatures in these matters represented the democratic decisions of a government established on the principle of consent
of the governed. Hence he felt that the Court should be very reluctant
to upset such decisions. But Justice Holmes was also concerned with
the social benefit to be derived from free discussion. His concept of
254 U. S. 325,41 S. Ct. 125, 65 L. Ed. 287 (1920).
301 U. S. 242, 57 S. Ct. 732, 81 L. Ed. 1066 (1937). See Barnette, Justice
Murphy, Civil Liberties and the Holmes Tradition, 32 CoaR. L. Q. 177, 183 (1946).
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"clear and present danger" was essentially a limitation on the doctrine
of judicial restraint. Interpreted in this light, his philosophy must be
read as declaring that legislation in the field of freedom of speech is
valid only if limited to cases of "clear and present danger." Holmes
did not explicitly resolve the paradox involved in these two principles;
but he did refuse to apply the doctrine of judicial restraint in these
cases in its absolute form.
The positive resolution of this problem appears to have begun in
1938, when the late Chief Justice Stone, then an associate justice, in
considering the question of the presumption of validity of legislation in
cases of civil liberty, stated: 48
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten Amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced with
the Fourteenth.

It was the late Justice Murphy who championed the cause of expanding the scope of protection of civil liberties by the presumption against
validity of legislation pertaining to these fundamental rights. In this
he was joined by Justices Black, Douglas and Rutledge in many decisions. The late Justice Rutledge made an eloquent and definitive
statement in Thomas v. Collins 47 of the protection now afforded:
The case confronts us again with the duty our system places on this
Court to say where the individual's freedom ends and the State's power
begins. Choice on that border, now as always delicate, is perhaps more
so where the usual presumption supporting legislation is balanced by the
preferred place given in our scheme to the great, the indispensable democratic freedoms secured by the First Amendment. That priority gives
these liberties a sanctity and a sanction not permitting dubious intrusions.
And it is the character of the right, not of the limitation, which determines what standard governs the choice.
For these reasons any attempt to restrict these liberties must be justified by clear public interest, 'threatened not doubtfully or remotely, but
by clear and present danger. The rational connection between the
remedy provided and the evil to be curbed, which in other contexts
might support legislation against attack on due process grounds, will not
suffice. These rights rest on a firmer foundation. Accordingly, whatever
occasion would restrain orderly discussion and persuasion, at appropriate
time and place, must have clear support in public danger, actual or impending. Only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give
occasion to permissible limitation.

The approach of the late Justice Murphy to this problem was clearly
indicated by his first dissent in litigation involving civil liberties in the
case of Jones- v. Opelika.48 He stated that the ordinary presumption
48 See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 58 S. Ct. 778,
783, n. 4, 82 L. Ed. 1234 (1934).
47 323 U. S. 516, 529, 65 S. Ct. 315, 89 L. Ed. 430 (1945); see 20 Nomm
DAmm LAwYER 336 (1945).
48 316 U. S. 584, 62 S. Ct. 1231, 86 L. Ed. 1691 (1942).
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of validity of legislation did not extend to statutes involving fundamental freedoms, and continued: 49
Liberty of conscience is too full of meaning for the individuals in this
Nation to permit taxation to prohibit or substantially impair the spread
of religious ideas, even though they are controversial and run counter
to the established notions of the community. If this Court is to err in
evaluating claims that freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and
freedom of religion have been invaded, far better that it err in being
overprotective of those precious rights.

These views of the late Justice Murphy were concurred in by Chief
Justice Stone, and Justices Black and Douglas. The view of Mr. Justice Black as to the stringency with which the "clear and present danger" test is to be applied is illustrated by his statement in Bridges v.
California:50 "What finally emerges from the 'clear-and-present danger' cases... is a working principle that the substantive evil must be
extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before
utterances can be punished."
Thus we see that the history of free speech since the Schenck case
has been that of the fight to have the "clear and present danger" test
accepted as the majority view of the Court, and then of the expansion
of the concept itself with the presumption against constitutional validity
of legislation. dealing with the fundamental freedoms. This expansion
of the concept can be seen if one will contrast the tests applied by
Holmes, Stone and Hughes with those employed by the modem Court.
If Holmes agreed with the presumption against the validity of legislation in free speech cases, he did so sub silentio. Chief Justice Hughes,
although a liberal and consistent defender of freedom of speech, decided cases of this nature on a basis of reasonableness as contained in
the doctrine of due process. 5 1 As can be seen from the statement of
Justice Rutledge in the Thomas case, this test of reasonableness is no
longer satisfactory. Chief Justice Stone, who decided many of the early
cases with which he dealt on a basis of due process, must, in view of
his later decisions, be classified with that element of the Court which
embraces the presumption against validity as an element of the "clear
and present danger" concept.
The views of the dissenting Justices on the present Court present the
other half of what is admittedly a dilemma in the Holmesian philosophy
as applied to the question of free speech. Mr. Justice Frankfurter is
the exponent of this school of thought. He stoutly maintains that he
is a close follower of the late Justice Holmes as he applies the doctrine
of judicial restraint in cases involving free speech. His views in this
regard are diametrically opposed to those of other alleged followers of
49
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Holmes who ddny the applicability of the doctrine of judicial restraint
in these cases. Frankfurter accuses those who refuse to apply this doctrine, of inserting their judgment in place of a democratic decision of the
legislature as to the protective scope of the First Amendment. His
viewpoint is based on the belief that the Court is scientifically and psychologically incapable of defining criteria for the imposition of limits to
the exercise of the right of52free speech, and therefore should bow to
the decision of the majority.
This point of view overlooks, it would seem, the fundamental nature
It
of these rights and their relationship to the democratic process.
is apparently grounded upon an inability to see that the protection of
these fundamental and constitutionally guaranteed rights is a condition
precedent to the efficient operation of our democratic system. The
measure of protection afforded the right of free discussion will be determinant of the degree of validity we may attach to the laws emanating
from our legislative process. If the legislatures of our nation are unable to obtain the results of the thorough factual discussion which freedom of speech furnishes, then we cannot say that they have been supplied with the necessary tools of intelligent legislation. Professor Chaffee summarizes this view when he says: 53
...statutes, to be sound and effective, must be preceded by abundant
printed and oral controversy. Discussion is really legislation in the soft.
Hence drastic restrictions on speeches and pamphlets are comparable to
rigid constitutional limitations on lawmaking . . . Liberty for the discussion which may lead to the formation of a dominant opinion belongs
side by side with the liberty of lawmakers to transform this dominant
opinion into the statute that is its natural outcome.

Justice Cardozo further illustrated the inconsistency of the position
held by those who would apply the doctrine of judicial restraint in free
speech cases when he declared: 54
Experimentation there may be in many things of deep concern, but
not in setting boundaries to thought, for thought freely communicated
is the indispensable condition of intelligent experimentation, the one test
of its validity.
52 See Minersvlle School District v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586, 597-98, 60 S. Ct.
1010, 84 L. Ed. 1375 (1940); West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,
319 U. S.624, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L. Ed. 1628 (1943).
58 CHAYFE, supra note 37, at 360.
54 CARiozo, THE PARAnox~s oF LEaAL Scmxcz 105 (1928). See SwrsHER, THE
GROwTH OF CONSTITUTIONAL PowER 3N

Hx Uxni

STATES 161 (1946), wherein

he also adopts this view when he says that while responsibility for government
rests with the people in a democracy, we nevertheless "find ourselves under the
necessity of limiting it by the proviso that self government imposed by the
people must not go so far as to cut off the facilities of expression and self education so as to make it impossible for the people to continue to govern themselves.
In other words, no tenable principles of political liberty will permit political
libertyto decree its own execution."
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The social validity of free discussion was one of the basic tenets of the
reasoning of John Stuart Mill, who said. 15
But the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of opinion is, that
it is robbing 'the human race; posterity as well as the existing gefieration;
those who dissent from the opinion still more than those who hold it.
If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth; if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit,
the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its
collision with error.

The quotation from Mill is fairly representative of what exponents of
freedom of speech have in mind as a philosophical justification for the
abuses involved in allowing freedom of discussion. Pope Leo XIII in
his great encyclical Human Liberty lays down a more definitive view
of what the right of free speech is in terms of the Natural Law. He
says: 56
Men have a right freely and prudently to propagate throughout the
State what things soever are true and honorable, so that as many as
possible may possess them; but lying opinions, than which no mental
plague is greater, and vices which corrupt the heart and moral life,
should be diligently repressed by public authority, lest they insidiously
work the ruin of the State. The excesses of an unbridled intellect, which
unfailingly end in the oppression of the untutored multitude, are no less
rightly controlled by the authority of the law than are the injuries
inflicted by violence upon the weak.

Pope Leo's analysis of the ethical problems presented in considering the
right of free speech could hardly be questioned. The common law contains many provisions, e.g., sedition and libel, which put this analysis in
practical operation. That the difficulty occurs when practical application of these principles is attempted is evidenced by the inability of the

Court to decide what speech falls within the permissible category.

It

should be remembered, however, that the failure of the courts, in many

instances, to prescribe proper limitations does not relieve the individual
of his duty to speak the truth.
The right of free speech is a natural right. As long as man stays
within the framework of the proper exercise of this right, it is beyond

the power of any man or government legitimately to restrain his speech.
The Supreme Court has recognized freedom of speech as a fundamental
right higher in the hierarchy of rights protected by the Constitution

than those rights not specifically enumerated therein, e.g., freedom of

contract. 57 Roscoe Pound had defined the interests protected by the
First Amendment as follows: 58
MiLL, LIBERTY 24 (Oxford Press ed. 1912).
Leo XIII, Libertas Humana 18 (Paulist Press ed. 1941).
57 See the careful classification of the provisions of the Bill of Rights into
these two categories in the majority opinion of Mr. justice Cardozo in Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 58 S. Ct. 149, 82 L. Ed. 288 (1937).
58 Quoted by Chaffee, Free Speech in Wartime in 2 SEcrmED EssAys in CoNsninurnoNA LAW 1024, 1047 (1938).
55
56
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There is the individual interest, the need of many men to express
their opinions on matters vital to them if life is to be worth living, and
a social interest in the attainment of truth, so that the country may not
only adopt the wisest course of action but carry it out in the wisest way.

All the members of the Court agree that freedom of speech must be
protected. It is equally obvious that the members do not have the
same referents for the concept of free speech. The confusion involved
is explicable when one possesses an understanding of the complexity of
the problems involved. A particular case may, and quite often does,
present a maze of conflicting interests and rights competing for recognition and protection. Granted the philosophical proposition that there
can be no conflict in ultimate principles, one is still confronted with the
practical problem of defining the boundaries of basic rights in their
exercise. Both elements of the Court have recognized judicial inability
to draw specific limits to these rights. This appears to be the last point
at which the opposing views are in substantial agreement. From this
point, jurists have split into two schools of thought: the majority of the
Court would say that any mistake to be made should be on the side of
overprotection of these basic rights, while the minority of the Court
would bow to the opinion of the popular majority as reflected by the
decisions of the legislature; the majority of the Court would not exercise the doctrine 6f judicial restraint because they consider free discussion to be a condition precedent to efficient legislation. This distinction in judicial attitudes does not provide us with the insight necessary to understand every case involving free speech. 59 It will, however,
quite often constitute an undisclosed major premise in the reasoning of
the particular Justices. Although Justice Douglas did not expressly
rely on the presumption against constitutional validity of legislation pertaining to civil rights in his majority opinion in the Terminiello case,
that presumption is at least implicit in his statement of the "clear and
present danger" test. He has assented to the doctrine in the past as
have, other members of the majority. The "presunjption against validity" in civil rights cases serves as one of the most important components used by the Court as it applies the test of "clear and present danger." A realization of the importance of this presumption in the disposition of civil rights cases is basic to an understanding of the methodology utilized by the present Court. A proper understanding of this
approach should cause some hesitation on the part of those who would
be prone to level an accusation of judicial irresponsibility against the
modem Court in its treatment of civil rights cases.
59 See Barnette, Mr. Justice Murphy, Civil Liberties and the Holmes Tradition, 32 Coax. L. Q. 177, 217 (1946), where he states: "Out of the welter of

differing factual situations and varying constitutional provisions comes one central
problem around which much of the difference of opinion on the Court in these
civil liberties cases may be oriented. Stated briefly, it is whether the presumptive
validity of legislation inherent in the revitalized doctrine of judicial self-restraint
shall apply to cases involving civil liberties."
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In this light, the Termineiflo case may be considered a logical extension of the presumption against validity of legislation pertaining to
civil rights. Realistically, the Court has once again recognized that
the "pinch" of civil rights legislation is in its application. This being
true, it was logical for them to review that application.6" The fundamental nature of the rights involved was apparently enough authorization for the Court to overlook procedural technicalities in their attempt
to afford genuine protection to these rights. They found that the
charge to the jury was not consonant with the constitutional treatment
to be afforded one attempting to exercise his right of free speech. The
Court declared its disapproval of a conviction had by unconstitutional
construction and application of an otherwise constitutional ordinance.
One would feel justified in predicting that the Court would not have reversed the conviction of Terminiello if the issue had been limited to
that of "fighting words." 61 In this respect, it is difficult to imagine
how the speaker could have chosen more offensive, or reprehensible
language. But the disgusting nature of these words did not empower
the trial court to convict upon a loosely drawn charge, which was in
fact violative of the accused's right of free speech under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.
Many jurists will deplore the procedural innovation, if such it was,
by which the majority of the Court reversed the conviction on grounds
discovered by their own search of the record. But the fair and openminded will recognize the value of the realistic approach of the Court
in attempting to solve the difficult problems presented in free speech
litigation. Those concerned with the procedural variations in civil
rights cases may conceivably fight to limit this liberality to civil rights
cases; but, it is suggested, they should not urge that this technical excuse be used to nullify the hard-won gains of the past ten years.
The Terminiello case represents an amplification of the scope of the
protection afforded freedom of speech under our Constitution. It adds
to the positive content of the "clear and present danger" test. It will,
it is hoped, serve as another judicial check on those who would resurrect
the now defunct concepts of "bad tendency" and "constructive intent."
These concepts have been very effectively utilized to suppress freedom
of speech. They have died hard. One respectfully, and regretfully,
suspects that some of the minority Justices on the present Court are
still in mourning.
The survival of liberty, as we know it, depends largely upon the
abiding faith of the people that liberty represents a prime value of life
which must be defended against every threatened invasion. The perennial struggle for liberty will rage on, and those who would be impatient
60
61

Terminiello v. City of Chicago, supra note 1.
See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 62 S. Ct. 766, 86 L. Ed.

1031 (1942).

NOTES
of the abuses of the right of free speech might well heed the warning of
Roscoe Pound when he states:

.

. . the rights of the best men are se-

cure only as the rights of the vilest and most abhorrent are protected." 62
In the last analysis, it will be the decision of the people themselves
that will determine the degree of freedom of speech they shall exercise.
Freedom of speech will have a positive correlation to their level of intelligence, tolerance and self-restraint. The growth of that freedom under our Constitution should be a matter of pride and not of concern.
Edward G. Coleman
FrancisW. Collopy

Sales
CANCELLATION OF PRE-EXISTING DEBT NOT VALUE AS TO BONA FIE
PURCHASER IN INDIANA AND MICHIGAN, CONTRARY TO

STATUTORY DEFINITION
More than a decade ago, the Appellate Court of Indiana' and the
Supreme Court of Michigan 2 held, contrary to the existing statutory
law in the respective states,3 that the cancellation of a pre-existing debt
does not constitute value, when applied to the bona fide purchaser for
value doctrine in the law of sales. These decisions have apparently
remained unchallenged. They reflect the common law of both jurisdictions and are in harmony with the majority rule prior to the enactment of the Uniform Sales Act.4 Directly opposing this doctrine at
62 Quoted by CHAaTEE, supra note 37, at 377.
1 Smith et al. v. Autocar Sales & Service Co. et al., 107 Ind. App. 244, 20
N.E. (2d) 188 (1939).
2 Automobile Equipment Co. v. Motor Bankers' Corp. et al., 251 Mich. 220,
231 N.W. 559 (1930).
3 IND. ANN. STAT. § 58-606 (Burns 1933); Micm. STAT. ANN. § 19.316 (Henderson 1937).
4 Federal: Commercial Nat. Bank et al. v. Pirie et al., 82 Fed. 799 (8th
Cir. 1897).
Alabama: Hawkins v. Damson & Abraham, 182 Ala. 83, 62 So. 15 (1913).
Arkansas: S. E. Lux, Jr., Mercantile Co. v. Jones et al.,
177 Ark. 342, 6 S.W.
(2d) 302 (1928); Hamilton v. Rankin, 108 Ark. 552, 158 S.W. 496 (1913);
Bard v. Meiser et al., 72 Ark. 494, 82 S.W. 836 (1904).
Kansas: Harbert et al. v. Fort Smith Canning Co. et al., 134 Kan. 240, 5
P. (2d) 849 (1931); Henderson et al. v. Gibbs et al., 39 Kan. 679, 18 Pac. 926
(1888).
Maine: Hurd v. Bickford, 85 Me. 217, 27 At. 107 (1892).
Michigan: Schloss et al. v. Feltus, 103 Mich. 525, 61 N.W. 797 (1895).
Mississippi: Lundy et al. v. Greenville Bank & Trust Co. et al., 179 Miss. 282,
174 So. 802 (1937).
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common law was a minority view which acknowledged the sufficiency
of a pre-existing debt as value. 5 This minority view, created to promulgate commercial efficiency, was incorporated into the Uniform
Sales Act. 6 The paradoxical appearance of the Indiana and Michigan
decisions in the light of the existing statutory provisions invites analysis. Initially, however, it is essential to examine briefly the conceptions of value at common law in relation to the transitions effected by
the uniform statute.
The problem usually arose in one of two situations. In one, A as
vendor sold goods to B, a fraudulent vendee who received a voidable
title. B then sold the goods to C, an innocent purchaser in good faith
who had no knowledge of B's fraud. In payment for the goods, C discharged a pre-existing debt owed him by B. When A learned of the
fraud, he attempted to avoid the sale and recover the goods from C.
In the other situation, B sold goods to A, but B remained in possession.
B later sold to C, who in good faith extinguished a pre-existing debt
of B's in payment thereof. The question was: did the cancellation of
an antecedent debt in these two instances satisfy the requirement of
value?
New Hampshire: Sleeper et al. v. Davis et al., 64 N. H. 59, 6 AtI. 201 (1886).
New York: Stevens v. Brennan, 79 N. Y. 254 (1879); Barnard v. Campbell,
55 N. Y. 456 (1874).

Ohio: Eaton v. Davidson, 46 Ohio St. 355, 21 N.E. 442 (1889).
Oklahoma: Knapp v. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Oklahoma City et al.,
154 F. (2d) 395 (10th Cir. 1946) (applying the substantive law of Oklahoma);
Wails et al. v. Farrington, 27 Okla. 754, 116 Pac. 428 (1911).
Pennsylvania: Ward Lumber Co. v. American Lumber & Mfg. Co., 247 Pa.
267, 93 At. 470 (1915).
South Carolina: Heyward-Williams Co. v. Zeigler et al., 106 S. C. 425, 91 S.E.
298 (1917).
Texas: Duncan v. Jones, 153 S.W. (2d) 214 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
Utah: Belleville Works v. Sorenson & Neilson Furniture Co. et al., 16 Utah
234, 52 Pac. 282 (1898).
Washington: Woonsocket Rubber Co. v. Loewenberg et al., 17 Wash. 29, 48
Pac. 785 (1897).
5 Federal: Pere Marquette Ry. Co. v. French & Co., 254 U. S. 538, 41 S. Ct.
195, 65 L. Ed. 391 (1920); Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1, 10 L. Ed. 865 (U. S. 1842);
Brooklyn City & Newton R. R. Co. v. National Bank of the Republic of New
York, 102 U. S. 14, 26 L. Ed. 61 (1879).
California: Virginia Timber & Lumber Co. v. Glenwood Lumber Co., S Cal.
App. 256, 90 Pac. 48 (1907).
Georgia: Agee v. Rhodes, 20 Ga. App. 117, 92 S.E. 771 (1917).
Illinois: Butters v. Haughwout et al., 42 1ll. 18 (1866).
Minnesota: Horton v. Williams, 21 Minn. 187 (1875).
Mississippi: Soule, Thomas & Wentworth v. Shotwell & Fitts, 52 Miss. 236
(1876).
Missouri: Strauss, Pritz & Co. v. Hirsch & Co. et al., 63 Mo. App. 95 (1895).
Wisconsin: Shufeldt v. Pease et al., 16 Wis. 689 (1863).
6 Uniform Sales Act § 76, 1 UNxsrosm LAWS ANN. 447 (1931).

NOTES
The rationale exemplified by the common law majority view stemmed
from the contention that the innocent buyer had given nothing of value
by cancelling a debt-that he could have been made whole again by
reviving the debt. Likewise, the original vendor could be restored to
his former position by the return of the property upon rescission of
the contract of sale. It was, theoretically, a return to the status quo.
As is true today in so many propositions, theory and actuality did not
always coincide. From a realistic standpoint, could the innocent purchaser invariably be restored to his former position? Even though his
legal right to collect the debt was revived, that may have been the extent of his restoration. Actually the debt, collectable at the time the
goods were accepted in satisfaction thereof, might conceivably have
been uncollectable due to the vendor's intervening insolvency or the
secreting of assets. Certainly the need for commercial expediency and
security of transactions, coupled with the fact that the innocent purchaser had changed his position in reliance on the sale, was a strong
argument in favor of the common law minority view.
Courts and legal authorities were divided at common law in applying the value concept to the cancellation of a pre-existing debt in exchange for real property 7 and in the transfer of negotiable instruments. 8
Uniformity was made possible first in this latter field by a clear statement inthe Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act that the cancellation
of a pre-existing debt in exchange for a promissory note constitutes
value. 9 Undoubtedly Professor Williston, in writing the Uniform Sales
Act, was inspired by the success of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments
Act and the functional approach to the problem taken by the jurisdictions advocating the minority view. When he drafted section 76 of the
Uniform Sales Act, he was fully aware that it was in derogation of the
majority common law view. 10 With this thought in mind, the manner
in which value is defined in section 76 becomes more understandable.
The words of this section are clear and unambiguous: 11
"Value" is any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract.
An antecedent or pre-existing claim, whether for money or not, constitutes value where goods or documents of title are taken either in satisfaction thereof or as security therefor.
7 Shirk et al. v. Thomas et al., 121 Ind. 147, 22 N.E. 976 (1889).
8 This conflict is illustrated by Bay v. Coddington, 9 Johns 54 (N. Y. 1821);
Coddington v. Bay, 20 Johns 637 (N. Y. 1822), which decided such a holder was
not a holder for value; Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1, 10 L. Ed. 865 (U. S. 1842).
Contra: Brooklyn City & Newton R. R. Co. v. National Bank of the Republic
of New York, 102 U. S.14, 26 L. Ed. 61 (1879).
9 Uniform Negotiable Instrument Law § 25, 5 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 287
(1943).
10 3 WnxMaTox, SALEs § 620 (rev. ed. 1948); see Commissioner's Note,
1 UNIronR LAws ANN. 448 (1931).
11 Uniform Sales Act § 76, 1 UmFoasm LAWS ANN. 447 (1931).
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Thus, since the cancellation of a pre-existing debt is valuable consideration sufficient to support a simple contract between the immediate
parties, it would seem that these words alone would have been sufficient. Yet the Act goes further and emphasizes in a separate sentence
that value is also given when goods or documents of title are taken
either to extinguish, or as security for, an antecedent or pre-existing
claim. Undoubtedly this additional explanation was to remove any
doubt existing at common law and to insure uniformity of the value
12
concept.
Thirty-four states, the District of Columbia, Alaska and Hawaii
have adopted the Uniform Sales Act since 1907.18 Of these, all but
two jurisdictions, Arizona and New York, accepted section 76 verbatim.
Arizona statutes do not include a definition of value,' 4 while New
York by amendment in 1935 adopted the uniform definition of value
for the first time,15 in response to the pressing need for uniformity in
commercial transactions. 16
With two notable exceptions, namely, Indiana and Michigan, all
the jurisdictions accepting the Uniform Sales Act with its definition
of value apparently conform to the plain and unambiguous meaning
of the statute.1" The decisions in Indiana 18 and Michigan 19 dearly
12 In section 1 of the Uniform Sales Act, in the definition of sale, the phrase
"for a consideration called a price" is used. But -the word "value" is used in
sections 24 and 25, pertaining to situations where the seller's title is defective,
and likewise in sections 33, 36, 38, and 39, dealing with negotiation of documents
of title. The "definitions" section gives the meaning of "value" but does not
indicate whether "value" is synonymous with "consideration" as the term is used
in section 1, except to say that "value" is any "consideration" sufficient to support
a simple contract. But "value" rather than "consideration" is a part of the bona
fide purchaser doctrine.
1' Alabama, 1931; Alaska, 1914; Arizona, 1907; Arkansas, 1941; California,
1931; Colorado, 1942; Connecticut, 1907; Delaware, 1933; District of Columbia,
1937; Hawaii, 1929; Idaho, 1920; Illinois, 1915; Indiana, 1929; Iowa, 1919;
Kentucky, 1928; Maine, 1923; Maryland, 1910; Massachusetts, 1909; Michigan,
1913; Minnesota, 1917; Nebraska, 1921; Nevada, 1915; New Hampshire, 1923;
New Jersey, 1907; New York, 1911; North Dakota, 1917; Ohio, 1909; Oregon, 1919; Pennsylvania, 1916; Rhode Island, 1908; South Dakota, 1921; Tennessee, 1919; Utah, 1917; Vermont, 1921; Washington, 1926; Wisconsin, 1912;
Wyoming, 1917.

14

15

ARiz. CODE ANN.§ 52-583 (1939).
N. Y. PEas. PRop. LAW § 156 and historical note.

16 For discussion of this subject in New York State, see Kennedy, "Value"-A Plea For Uniformity In New York Commercial Law, 8 ST. JoHN'S L. REv. 1
(1933); Whitney, "Value--A Reply To Professor Kennedy, 8 ST. JoNq's L. REv.
285 (1934); Whitney, Value And The Doctrine Of Bona Fide Purchase, 7 ST.
JoEN's L. Rrv. 181 (1933); see Notes, 5

BROOxLYN

L. Ray. 97 (1935); 5 FoRD.

L. REv. 80 (1936).
17 For representative cases, see Blumberg v. Taggart et al., 213 Minn. 39,
5 N.W. (2d) 388 (1942); Reynolds v. Park Trust Co. et al., 245 Mass. 440,
139 N.E. 785 (1923); Wooley v. Crescent Automobile Co., 83 N. J. L. 244, 83
AtI. 876 (1912).
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indicate that their courts are still defining value according to their
common law concepts and in contradiction of the specific statutory
language.
Ten years after the adoption of the Uniform Sales Act in Indiana, 20
the appellate court of the state, in Smith et al. v. Autocar Sales and
Service Co., et al.,2 1 held that one is not a bona fide purchaser for
value of goods obtained in payment of an antecedent debt. The facts
of the case are clearly within the purview of section 24 of the Uniform
Act: 22
Where the seller of goods has a voidable title thereto, but his title
has not been avoided at the time of the sale, the buyer acquires a good
title to the goods, provided he buys them in good faith, for value, and
without notice of the seller's defect of title. (Emphasis supplied.)

The plaintiff, a wholesale truck distributor, sold a truck to a retail
dealer who paid for it with a worthless check. Before the fraud was
discovered, the dealer sold the truck to the defendant, who paid for it
by cancelling an antecedent debt owed by the dealer to the defendant.
The plaintiff in this action sought to repossess the truck from the
defendant.
In the trial court, the sole issue involved was the question of the
defendant's good faith, the plaintiff claiming that the defendant was
not a purchaser without notice. The record is silent regarding value.
No question was raised concerning its sufficiency. 23 The jury's verdict
was for the plaintiff, and the defendant appealed, basing his appeal
upon the proposition that the evidence was insufficient at law to sustain the finding that the defendant had knowledge of the fraud perpetrated upon the plaintiff.2 4
It should be clearly understood that on appeal neither party's
argument contested the sufficiency of value in the transaction. 25 This
is of paramount significance in view of the line of reasoning followed
by the court:28
18

Smith et al. v. Autocar Sales & Service Co. et al., 107 Ind. App. 244, 20

N.E. (2d) 188 (1939).

19 Automobile Equipment Co. v. Motor Bankers' Corp. et al., 251 Mich. 220,

231 N.W. 559 (1930).

20 The Uniform Sales Act was adopted in Indiana in 1929: IN. ANN. STAT.

§ 58-101 et seq. (Burns 1933).
21
22

107 Ind. App. 244, 20 N.E. (2d) 188 (1939).
Uniform Sales Act § 24; LD. AxN. STAT. § 58-208 (Burns 1933).

23

Transcript of Record, pp. 35-37, Smith et al. v. Autocar Sales & Service

Co. et al., 107 Ind. App. 244, 20 N.E. (2d) 188 (1939).
24 Original Transcript, Appellate Court No. 15966; Appeal from the Ripley

County Circuit Court to Appellate Court of Indiana; Brief for Appellants on
Appeal, Smith et al. v. Autocar Sales & Service Co. et al., 107 Ind. App. 244,
20 N.E. (2d) 188 (1939).
25 Briefs for Appellant and Appellee, Smith et al. v. Autocar Sales & Service
Co. et aL, 107 Ind. App. 244, 20 N.E. (2d) 188 (1939).
26

See note 18 supra, 20 N.E. (2d) at 189.
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Without going into the sufficiency of the evidence to show knowledge,
it is apparent from the record that the appellants are not bona fide
purchasers of the truck for a valuable consideration. The record conclusively shows that the only consideration afforded by the appellants
for the purchase of the truck in question was the credit upon their,
account against Potten. They gave no additional consideration for this
truck and incurred no liability therefor. They accordingly are not in
the position of bona fide purchasers for a valuable consideration.

Thus the appellate court determined the case upon a point of law not
raised during the trial or on appeal. Certainly this was within the
court's discretion. However, in the exercise of this prerogative the law
was erroneously interpreted.
An examination of the court's opinion readily discloses that the
decision was not predicated upon the statutory definition of value
in the Indiana law, but upon three cases decided at the turn of the last
century 2 7 and a general rule quoted from Ruling Case Law 28 and
American Law Reports. 2 9 The court's opinion and the original transcript clearly indicate that neither the defendant nor the court took
cognizance of the definition of value in the Indiana statute. Furthermore, in the defendant's petition for a rehearing before the appellate
court so and in his petition for transfer to the supreme court, 3 ' this
incorrect interpretation of value was not challenged. The defendant
at this point categorically admitted that as a general rule the cancellation of an antecedent debt was not value.32 But to circumvent
this alleged general rule, the defendant argued for the first time in
this litigation that the factual situation of the case rendered this rule
inapplicable. The petitions were denied.3 a As a result, this decision
stands out as a direct contradiction of the statutory law in Indiana.
In 1915, Michigan became the tenth state to enact the Uniform
Sales Act. Section 76 was adopted as originally drafted 4 The statute
was in derogation of Michigan common law, for the Michigan Supreme
Court had consistently refused to allow, as value, the satisfaction of a
27 Adam, Meldrum & Anderson Co. v. Stewart et al., 157 Ind. 678, 61 N.E.
1002 (1901); Waterbury et al. v. Miller, 13 Ind. App. 197, 41 N.E. 383 (1895);
Curme, Dunn & Co. et al. v. Rauh et al., 100 Ind. 247 (1885).
28 24 R.C.L., Sales § 602.
29 See Note, 44 A.L.R. 488 (1926).
30 Brief for Appellant in support of their Petition for Rehearing, pp. 13-14,
Smith et al. v. Autocar Sales & Service Co. et al., 107 Ind. App. 244, 20 N.E.
188 (1939).
31 Petition of Appellant to Transfer from Appellate Court to Supreme Court,
p. 1, Smith et al. v. Autocar Sales & Service Co. et al., 107 Ind. App. 244, 20 N.E.
(2d) 188 (1939).
32 Ibid.
33
Smith et al. v. Autocar Sales & Service Co. et al.,107 Ind. App. 244,
20 N.E. (2d) 188 (1939).
34 Mic. STAT. ANN. § 19.316 (Henderson 1937).
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pre-existing debt in exchange for the transfer of goods.3 5 In the early
Michigan cases, it was insisted that the law of negotiable instruments
was merely an exception to this general rule, and was predicated upon
a policy of promoting security and free flow of commercial paper s
The common law, as applicable to sales, had been crystallized long
before the adoption of the Uniform Sales Act in the pivotal case of
Schloss v. Feltus.8 7 Reflecting a trend exemplified by previous holdings, the supreme court refused to recognize the cancellation of an
antecedent debt as the equivalent of value. However, Justice Montgomery, in a forceful and challenging dissent, stated: 38
It seems to me illogical and confusing to apply in the one case a test
in determining whether one is a bona fide purchaser which does not
obtain in the other... Certainly, if the discharge of a pre-existing debt
can be said to be parting with something of value, and a new consideration, when it is paid for a promissory note, it is inconceivable how
it can, on the other hand, be said not to be of value, and a new consideration, when paid for a bale of cotton.

Apparently this dissent provoked very little judicial appreciation of
the reasoning involved therein, as the majority opinion was applied
without question in subsequent decisions.3 9
In 1930, seventeen years after the enactment of the Uniform Sales
Act, the Michigan Supreme Court was again confronted by litigants
seeking a definition of the word value. The case, Automobile Equipment Co. v. Motor Bankers' Corp.,40 presented a controversy clearly
within the provisions of section 25 of the Uniform Act.4 1 The complex
facts, briefly stated, involved the sale of an automobile. The plaintiff
paid for the vehicle partly in cash, partly in merchandise, and partly
by cancelling a debt which the dealer owed him. Unknown to the
plaintiff, this dealer had previously sold the automobile to another
party, the defendant, who allowed the dealer to retain possession of
the vehicle and its certificate of title. The defendant obtained possession of the car peaceably, and the plaintiff brought suit for conversion, claiming to be a bona fide purchaser for value. On appeal to
42
the supreme court both parties made this stipulation:
35 Kops Bros. Co. v. Stephen B. Smith & Co., 137 Mich. 28, 100 N.W. 169
(1904) ; Schloss et al. v. Feltus, 103- Mich. 525, 61 N.W. 797 (1895).
8 See, e.g., Schloss et al. v. Feltus, supra note 35.
87 Ibid.
38 61 N.W. at 799.
39 Kops Bros. Co. v. Stephen B. Smith & Co., 137 Mich. 28, 100 N.W. 168
(1904).
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251 Mich. 220, 231 N.W. 559 (1930).

§ 19.265 (Henderson 1937).
Briefs for appellant and appellee, S. Ct. Records and Briefs, Automobile
Equipment Co. v. Motor Bankers' Corp. et al., 251 Mich. 220, 231 N.W. 559
(1930).
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Admitting plaintiff to have acquired title to said automobile and to
be a bona fide purchaser thereof to the extent of payment made at the
time of purchase, is it a bona fide purchaser to the extent of its surrender and cancellation of existing indebtedness?

In resolving this question, the supreme court followed the common
law doctrine of the state, reiterating that one who receives a chattel,
in satisfaction of a pre-existing debt, from a seller whose title is defeasable, is not a purchaser for value. The court's opinion is completely
devoid of any reference to section 76 of the Uniform Act. 43 An examination of the plaintiff's brief discloses that his entire case is based
upon section 25:44
Where a person having sold goods continues in possession of the
goods, or of negotiable documents of title to the goods, the delivery or
transfer by that person, or by an agent acting for him, of the goods
or documents of title under any sale, pledge, or other disposition thereof,
to any person receiving and paying value for the same in good faith
and without notice of the previous sale, shall have the same effect as if
the person making the delivery or -transfer were expressly authorized
by the owner of the goods -to make the same. (Emphasis supplied.)

On the basis of the aforesaid stipulation of the parties, value is the
key word in this section. Upon its construction the case should have
turned. In the plaintiff's brief a strong policy argument was made
for a liberal interpretation of value, but ironically enough, the specific
statutory definition of the term was not drawn to the court's attention.
The plaintiff in its brief contended: 45
It would be illogical to assume that this section [§ 25] of the statute
should be construed to mean that the purchaser under the circumstances
therein outlined, does not acquire complete title to the goods, but only
title insofar as he has paid cash . . . If such were the case, innumerable
hardships would be worked on purchasers in many instances.
In the case at bar, the plaintiff was diligently endeavoring to collect
its past due account and, had not it purchased the car -here in question
and thereby cancelled its indebtedness, it would have sought other means
to realize satisfaction. Having purchased the car it no longer sought to
collect, and six weeks later, when the defendant Schoneman appeared
as claimant to the car, the plaintiff could not collect from Community
Motors, Inc.

Logically, the meaning of value as defined in section 76 should hage
been applied in the interpretation of section 25 to dispel any ambiguity
surrounding the scope of value. 46 It would seem to be a permissible
Uniform Sales Act § 76; MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 19.316 (Henderson 1937).
44 Uniform Sales Act § 25; Micn. STAT. AN. § 19.265 (Henderson 1937).
45 Brief of the Appellants, pp. 13-14, S. Ct. Records and Briefs, Automobile
Equipment Co. v. Motor Bankers' Corp. et al., 251 Mich. 220, 231 N.W. 559
(1930).
46 In order to give effect to a statute, courts will sometimes transpose sentences so as to place them in their intended connection with sentences to which
they relate. Detroit v. Chaffee, 70 Mich. 80, 37 N.W. 882 (1888).
43
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presumption that the plaintiff completely overlooked this statutory
definition of value and the court did not take judicial notice thereof.
The conception of value expressed in the Uniform Sales Act is a
product of legislative courage in casting off artificial and unrealistic
fetters restraining the free advance of commercial trade. In a like
manner the laws governing negotiable instruments, 47 warehouse receipts 48 and bills of lading 49 have been disencumbered of their
"rubrics of ancient ritual."
It can no longer be seriously contended that a definition of value
suitable to over-the-counter transactions in an infant economy can
satisfactorily be applied to a modem, ever-expanding credit economy
covering past, present and future transactions. It is difficult to comprehend why the courts of Indiana and Michigan have applied this
archaic conception of value in the cases discussed above. In reviewing
these decisions, one may speculate that the holdings were the result
either of mere oversight, or of deliberate judicial legislation caused
by slavish adherence to the rigidity of stare decisis. Both states have
consistently adhered to the principle that statutes in derogation of
the common law are to be strictly construed. 50 However, if -the statute
covers the whole subject, there should be no room for any other rule,
and the common law should have no function beyond that of interpreting words not otherwise provided for. In the instant cases the
meaning of the word value was clearly defined in the statutes. Certainly it is reasonable to say that once the legislature has specifically
given a statutory definition to a term, that definition must control the
construction of the statute.5 '
The error into which the courts of Indiana and Michigan have fallen
is not unprecedented. It is interesting to note that from 1914 until
1917, the Supreme Court of Alabama was in an analogous dilemma,
attributable to the failure of the court to take cognizance of a statutory
52
change effected by the enactment of the Negotiable Instruments Law.
The court, in finally recognizing the error of previous cases, said: 58
Formerly it was the law of this state-settled by the decisions of this
court ... that one who held negotiable paper taken as collateral security
for a pre-existing debt was not a bona fide holder for value, and not
entitled to protection against equities and defenses existing between
prior parties . . . But it results from some definitions contained in the

Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, adopted in this state in 1907 ...
47 Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law § 25, 5 UNxR

LAWS ANN.

287

(1943).
48
49

Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act § 58, 3 UwaoR LAWS ANN. 92 (1922).
Uniform Bills of Lading Act § 53, 4 UNIFoRm LAWS ANN. 78 (1922).

50 Sibley v. Smith et al., 2 Mich. 487 (1853); Gavin v. Shuman, 23 Ind.
32 (1864).
51 State ex rel. Baker v. Grange et al., 200 Ind. 506, 165 N.E. 239 (1929).
52 ALA. CoDE Asisi. tit. 39, § 29 (1940).

58 Vogler et al. v. Manson, 200 Ala. 351, 76 So. 117, 118 (1917).
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that our law on the point mentioned above has been changed. . . This
change in the law was overlooked in Miller v. Johnson, 189 Ala. 354,
66 South. 486 [1914], and on this point the court there fell into error.

It is reasonable to predict that a similar judicial recognition of past
error will occur in Indiana and Michigan when future litigation arises
involving the interpretation of the term value in the Uniform Sales Act.
John L. Globensky
Lenton G. Sculthorp

Conflict of Laws
ACQUISITION OF IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION OVER NONRESIDENT
CITIZENS "DOING BUSINESS" WITHIN THE STATE.
The exercise of in personam jurisdiction over nonresident individual
citizens, when based solely upon activity within the state asserting that
jurisdiction, presents a constitutional question of considerable perplexity; a perplexity which, it is submitted, has not been markedly relieved
by the previous attempts of the Supreme Court to deal with the matter.
It cannot be disputed that the now-elementary proposition decided
in Pennoyer v. Neff 1 that in personam judgments rendered without
personal jurisdiction are void as violative of due process, cannot today
be employed effectively without an understanding of the changing concept of personal jurisdiction. As Chief Justice Stone stated in International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington: 2
Historically the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personam
is grounded on their de facto power over the defendant's person. Hence
his presence within the territorial jurisdiction of a court was prerequisite
to its rendition of a judgment personally binding -him . . .But now that

the capias ad respondendum has given way to personal service of summons or other form of notice, due process requires only that in order to
subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within
the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it
such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice."

The foregoing is dictum, and, as a statement of the present law, is not
entirely accurate. The extent to which its generalities may be supported today in the case of nonresident natural persons "doing business"
within a state is the subject of this paper.
Personal jurisdiction over nonresidents not personally served in suits
arising out of activity within the state, when allowed, is generally justi1 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. Ed. 565 (1878).
2 326 U. S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 154, go L. Ed. 95 (1945).
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fled on the basis of consent, actual or implied. In regard to the latter,

the following caveat in Pennoyer v. Neff is interesting: 8
Neither do we mean to assert that a State may not require a nonresident entering into a partnership or associatioii within its limits, or
making contracts enforceable there, to appoint an agent or representative
in the State to receive service of process ... and provide, upon their failure
to make such appointment or to designate such place that service may be
made upon a public officer designated for that purpose ...

Of course, "implied consent" is no consent at all. Jurisdiction purportedly based upon a "mode of service [that] may be considered to have
been assented to in advance" 4 is, in reality, jurisdiction acquired by virtue of a power to subject to jurisdiction one who has not consented to
such jurisdiction.
The doctrine of implied consent was applied most easily to foreign
corporations, since state power over such corporations has long been
recognized as including the power to prohibit their actions entirely, 5 and
thus to make consent to service a condition of admission.6

Moreover,

such consent may be implied where the foreign corporation is "doing
business" to a degree sufficient to allow the fiction,7 and it is not un-

reasonable to subject it to suit in that jurisdiction. 8

This, of course,

can be applied with equal reason to partnerships when considered as

legal entities. 9
If, however, the power to exclude is alone relied upon to sustain the
right to such jurisdiction over individuals, the rights of citizens under
the Privileges and Immunities Clause comes into question.

As Jus-

tice Holmes stated in Flexner v. Farson,in holding void a judgment obtained by service on the former agent of two nonresident partners on
the basis of their "doing business" within the state: 10
The analogy of suits against insurance companies based upon such
service is invoked. But the consent that is said to be implied in such cases
is a mere fiction, founded upon the accepted doctrine that the States could
exclude foreign corporations altogether, and therefore could establish this
obligation as a condition fo letting them in. The State had no power to
exclude the defendants and on that ground without going farther the Supreme Court of Illinois rightly held that the analogy failed.....

As concerns the question of the constitutionality of such state action, the
foregoing is undoubtedly dictum, since the person served was not in
fact the defendant's agent for any purpose at the time of the attempted
& 95 U. S. 714, 735, 24 L. Ed. 565 (1878).
4 95 U. S. at 733.
5 Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519, 10 L. Ed. 274 (U. S. 1839).
6 Lafayette Ins Co. v. Frdnch, 18 How. 407, 15 L. Ed. 451 (U. S. 1856).
7 People's Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 246 U. S. 79, 38 S. Ct. 233,
62 L. Ed. 587 (1918).
8 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310, 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed.
95 (1945).
9 Sugg v. Thornton, 132 U. S. 524, 10 S. Ct. 163, 33 L. Ed. 447 (1889).
10 248-U. S. 289, 293, 39 S. Ct. 97, 63 L. Ed. 250 (1918).
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service; but, dictum or not, it has not been without force, even if it has
not proved sufficient to dispose of the situation finally.
The rationale of Flexner v. Farson,if having the virtue of simplicity,
suffers also the characteristic disadvantages of over-simplification. While
it can be conceded that state power to exclude carries with it the right
to set reasonable regulations for admission, it does not seem to follow
that state power to regulate conduct within the state and to determine
the legal consequences of such activity must depend on the power to
exclude alone. Thus in International Harvester v. Kentucky," the
same Court, construing, incidentally, the same statute 12 as that later
considered in Flexner v. Farson, refused to invalidate a judgment obtained by substituted service against a foreign corporation engaged in
interstate commerce. In answering the contention that, since Kentucky
had no right to exclude a corporation engaged solely in interstate commerce, it therefore had no right to subject it to such service, the Court
stated: 18
True, it has been held time and again that a state cannot burden interstate commerce or pass laws which amount to the regulation of such commerce; but this is a long way from holding that the ordinary process of
the courts may not reach corporations carrying on business within the
state which is wholly of an interstate commerce character. Such corporations are within the state, receiving the protection of its laws, and may,
and often do, have large properties located within the state.

From the point of view of the power to exclude, it is difficult to find an
essential difference between the force of the prohibition implied in the
Commerce Clause and that of the individual protection afforded by the
Privileges and Immunities Clause.
The explanation is, of course, that, while Kentucky could not exclude that corporation, since that would be an unreasonable burden on
interstate commerce, it would not necessarily be an unreasonable burden to require that it be subject to suit. For instance, in Davis v. Farmers' Coop. Equity Co.,24 jurisdiction asserted through service on the
soliciting agent of a carrier not operating within the state was denied
in a case brought against the carrier by a nonresident defendant on a
cause of action arising outside the state because it would impose an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce, even though the state presumably could have excluded the carrier's agent and did purport to
base its right to serve the agent on its right so to exclude.
The doctrine of exclusion, then, seems hardly adequate to the tasks
which it is called upon to bear. While it can hardly be denied that it
has served to dispose of the cases presented to the Supreme Court thus
11
12
(1912);
Is
14

234 U. S. 579, 34 S. Ct. 944, 58 L. Ed. 1479 (1914).
See International Harvester Co. v. Comm., 147 Ky. 655, 145 S. W. 393, 394
Flexner v. Farson et al., 268 Ill. 435, 109 N. E. 327 (1915).
234 U. S. 579, 588, 34 S. Ct. 944, 58 L. Ed. 1479 (1914).
262 U. S. 312, 43 S. Ct. 556, 67 L. Ed. 996 (1923).
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far, and while undoubtedly others can be justified on that basis without going further, the fact nonetheless remains that as a basis of legal
analysis the doctrine leaves much to be desired. Logical defense of
the assertion of state power to subject nonresidents to suit in its courts
would seem to require that such power be in itself somehow necessary
to the protection of the state's citizens. It would also seem logical that
if this can be called a reasonable exercise of the police power, no question of exclusion need arise. A state asserting such power for the
protection of its citizens is not attempting to prevent the free passage
of citizens of other states; neither is it discriminating against nonresidents. If the assertion of such power is unreasonable, it is void for
that reason, and not because to assert it is to assert the power to exclude.
Conversely, if the assertion of the power is unreasonable because it
places a burden on interstate commerce or offends "traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice," it is not made reasonable because
of the existence of the right to exclude.
Evidence is not wanting that the exercise of this power is necessary,
at least in certain instances. In suits arising out of business activity
within the state, it is at least convenient that the plaintiff be relieved
of the necessity of traveling to some other state where the defendant
may be found. Where the matter is a small one, and the distance great,
this is not merely a convenience, but a necessity. As has been stated: 15
In many instances the cost of the remedy would have largely exceeded
the value of its fruits. In suits local in their character, both at law and
in equity, there could be no relief. The result would be, to a large extent,
immunity from all legal responsibility.

On the other hand, where the defendant is doing business in the state
through agents, it does not seem unreasonable to require that he answer to suits brought against him in that jurisdiction in matters arising
out of such business. The important fact in this reasoning is that it
applies with equal force to individual as well as corporate defendants.
While the power is more easily asserted when an incident to some
other exercise of the police power, just as it is asserted more easily still
when the power to exclude exists, it does not seem illogical to argue
that the assertion of this power in itself is so necessary to the protection
of the citizens of a state as to be a legitimate exercise of the police
power. As one court stated it: 16
The thought is not shocking that one who comes into a state for the
purpose of conducting his business in that state should be made amenable
to the courts and laws of the state and answerable to its citizens for damages sustained by them which were the -result of the business transacted
in the state.
15 B. & 0. R. Co. v. Harris, 12 Wall. 65, 84, 20 L. Ed. 354 (U. S. 1871),
quoted in Scott; Jurisdiction over Nonresidents Doing Business Within a State, 32
HARV. L. Rxv. 871 (1919).
16 Sugg v. Hendrix, 142 F. (2d) 740 (6th Cir. 1944).
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The extent to which the Supreme Court has been moved by that argument remains for discussion.
It might be mentioned parenthetically that, aside from the question
of exclusion, no objection need arise on the basis of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause, since statutes purporting to give such in personam
jurisdiction, when otherwise valid, are upheld when they place nonresidents on substantially equal footing with residents in the manner of service. 17 The problem of adequacy of notice and hearing is likewise collateral, since the Court has held that "reasonable probability" of notice
and adequate provision for continuances satisfy the requirements of due
8
process.'
It must also be reiterated that the power here considered is that
sought to be justified on the basis of the individual activity which has
been frequently called "doing business" in speaking of a similar power
in regard to foreign corporations. It is not contended that the doing
of a single act of any type subjects a nonresident individual to personal
jurisdiction, 19 or that activity within the state should subject nonresident individuals to suit in actions not arising out of business within the
state; neither is the sole concern with cases involving hazardous activi20
ty, such as that considered in Hess v. Pawloski.
In that case, Hess, a resident of Pennsylvania, was sued in the courts
of Massachusetts for damages resulting from an automobile accident
alleged to have been caused through his negligence. Although no attachment of his property was attempted, he was not personally served,
but received substituted service pursuant to a Massachusetts statute
authorizing service on the registrar in automobile accident cases involving nonresident defendants. Hess received personal notice by registered mail, and, as required by the statute, the return receipt was
affixed to the writ. Hess appeared specially, and upon an affirmance of
an order overruling his motion, an appeal was taken on the ground
that the statute in question was, among other things, violative of due
process. As the Court reasoned in affirming the Massachusetts court,
automobiles are "dangerous machines" 21 and thus a legitimate subject
for the exercise of the police power. There is ample precedent for regarding the use of automobiles a matter of peculiarly local concern, since
the Court had earlier held in Kane v. New Jersey 22 that to require a
17 Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U. S. 623, 55 S. Ct. 553, 79 L.
Ed. 1097 (1935); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352, 47 S. Ct. 632, 71 L. Ed. 1091
(1927).
18

Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U. S. 13, 48 S. Ct. 259, 72 L. Ed. 446 (1928).

19 Beale cites Singh v. Rajah of Faridkot, [18941 A. C. 670, as being the
only case where that proposition was seriously urged. I BE=, Co.NLicT oi
LAws § 84.1 (1935).
20 274 U. S. 352, 47 S. Ct. 632, 71 L. Ed. 1091 (1927).
21 274 U. S. at 356.
22 242 U. S. 160, 37 S. Ct. 30, 61 L. Ed. 222 (1916).
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nonresident to obtain a license to use the highways of the state was not
an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce.
The Court also observed in the Hess case, on the authority of Flexner v. Farson, that: "The mere transaction of business in a state by
nonresident natural persons does riot imply consent to be bound by the
process of its courts." 23 Here, as in Flexner v. Farson,the statement is
dictum, since the Court was concerned with the special circumstance of
the use of the highways, although when taken as excluding all other
circumstances, such as the nature and extent of a particular business,
it will quite probably be followed.
It is perhaps well at this point to consider in some detail the case
of Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman.2 4 In that case, Doherty, a
resident of New York trading under the name of Henry L. Doherty &
Co., maintained an office in Iowa for the handling of his securities business there. A controversy arose concerning a sale of stock made by an
agent operating out of this office, and service upon Doherty was made
by service on the agent in charge of this office, who, however, had
never been given authority to accept service of process. This action
was in conformity with an Iowa statute 25 authorizing such service on
the agent of any corporation, company or individual residing in another
county in actions arising out of such agency. This is held to authorize
suits against nonresidents of the state. 26 Doherty appeared specially,
claiming a denial of due process. In holding that the statute was not
violative of due process, the Court was careful to point out that Iowa
had subjected the securities business to regulation. The importance of
this is seen in the Court's treatment of Flexner v. Farson. While distinguishing that case on the ground that the person on whom service was
made there was not in fact the agent of the defendant, the Court seemed
not unmindful of Holmes' dictum grounding these cases on the right to
exclude, since Justice McReynolds was quick to add: "Moreover,
under the laws of Iowa, neither her citizens nor non-residents could
freely engage in the business of selling securities." 27 It could hardly
be stated, however, that Iowa could prohibit entirely business in
securities, since that surely would be an abuse of the police power.
Neither could it be said that Iowa could exclude the defendant
entirely. Iowa could, however, as an aspect of the police power, regulate the securities business, as well as regulate the conduct of the defendant generally, so long as such regulation did not result in unreasonabe discrimination against nonresidents.
28
24
25

274 U. S. 352, 355,47 S. Ct. 632, 71 L. Ed.1091 (1927).
294 U. S. 623, 55 S. Ct. 553, 79 L. Ed. 1097 (1935).
IowA CODE, Rules of Civ. Proc. § 56(g) (1946), formerly IowA CoDE §

11079 (1931).
26

Davidson v. Henry L. Doherty & Co., 214 Iowa 739, 241 N. W. 700 (1932);

see Note, 91 A. L. R. 1327 (1934).

27

294 U. S. 623, 628, 55 S. Ct. 5 3, 79 L. Ed. 1097 (1935).
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The fact that Doherty was sued in his trade name, and thus possibly
as a legal, rather than a natural entity, seems not to have been the basis
of the Court's decision, since an earlier Iowa case, Davidson v. Henry L.
Doherty & Co.,2 s relied upon and quoted at length by the Court in

Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, founds its reasoning in favor of
jurisdiction on the assumption that the defendant was protected by the
Privileges and Immunities Clause as an individual citizen.
From a discussion of the Doherty case, the last pronouncement of
the Supreme Court, certain conclusions emerge. It must first be recognized that the dictum of Flexner v. Farson, regardless of its inadequacies, is far from discredited. While it can be argued that occasion
to discredit it has not yet appeared, it cannot be denied that thus far
the Supreme Court has been at pains to meet its requirements. Whatever the rationale of the decision, however, it seems apparent from the
unmistakable air of judicial hesitancy in Hess v. Pawloski and the Doherty case that the extent to which nonresident individuals can be unwillingly subjected to in personam jurisdiction without personal service
has definite limits. In each case, the matter regulated was one of peculiar concern to the residents of the state, although in the Doherty
case the statute purporting to give jurisdiction was quite broad in its
terms. It might well be inferred from the tendency to limit each case
to its facts that the assumption of such jurisdiction will only be upheld
when incidental to some other exercise of the police power.
Most of the subsequent cases in the federal and state courts either
proceed on that theory expressly or are capable of being explained
through its application. Thus in Sugg v. Hendrix,2

9

the Circuit Court

of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held service obtained on the agent of
a nonresident partnership engaged in hazardous operations sufficient
to bind individual partners. In resting the claim to jurisdiction on the
hazardous nature of the business, the court also made the following
comment: 30
The inadequacy of the doctrine in Flexner v. Farson to cope with the
increasing problem of practical -responsibility for hazardous business conducted in absentia is apparent, and the trend is in the other direction.

The use of such service in obtaining personal jurisdiction over a
pawnbroker, 31 and a person engaged in the licensed business of termite eradication, 3 2 has been similarly justified as an incident to the
exercise of the police power.
A recent case in Arkansas,3 3 in upholding substituted service on a
nonresident defendant in a suit to recover damages for negligent
28

29
30
31
32

83

214 Iowa 739, 241 N. W. 700 (1932).
142 F. (2d) 740 (5th Cir. 1944).
Id. at 742.
L. G. Balfour Co. v. Brown, 110 S. W. (2d) 104 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
Condon et al. v. Snipes, ....Miss...., 38 So. (2d) 752 (1949).
Gillioz v. Kincannon, 214 S. W. (2d) 212 (Ark. 1948).
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burning of grass and timber, sustained the constitutionality of a
statute purporting to give personal jurisdiction over nonresident individuals engaging in any business within the state. While the language
of the court was as broad as that of the statute, 34 it is perhaps well
to note that Arkansas, conscious of the danger of forest fires, has
subjected the burning of timber land to regulation, providing criminal
penalties for negligence 3 5 and authorizing double recovery in civil
suits. 3 On the other hand, one federal court, in denying in broad
terms the validity of the same type of service on a natural person
engaged in the securities business, nonetheless noted that the suit, while
arising out of the business of the defendant, was not one involving a
violation of the local securities law.37
There are, however, states where the character of the business
conducted has been clearly held to be immaterial. The New York
Appellate Division, in Interchemical Corp. v. Mirabelli,38 upheld such
service on a person engaged in the business of manufacturing clothing.
As the court, after a review of the Supreme Court cases, quite frankly
stated:8 9
The Supreme Court limited its decision in the cases cited to the proposition that the police power of the state to regulate acts engaged in
within the state requiring special state supervision ... embraces the power
to require submission by the actor to its jurisdiction. The New York
Legislature, in its wisdom, has adopted the broad view urged by many
writers that a state may require a nonresident individual to submit to
reasonable provisions for substituted service to secure personal jurisdiction
as a condition of voluntarily doing any sort of business within the
state.... (Emphasis supplied.)

A similar result was reached in Utah,40 over vigorous dissent, on the
basis of the reasonableness and necessity of such service.
If the liberal language of Chief justice Stone can be taken to represent the concept of personal jurisdiction presently entertained by the
Supreme Court, there can be little doubt that the existence of consent,
actual or implied, will not in the future be considered of controlling influence in determining the existence of state power to subject nonresidents not personally served to in personam jurisdiction. If the fiction
of implied consent is to fall, it would seem that the doctrine of exclusion
as the basis for determining the right to imply consent would fall with
it. Even if the broader view of personal jurisdiction is not adopted,
A x. STAT. ANN. § 27-340 (1947).
35 ARx. STAT. ANw. § 41-507 (1947).
36 ARx. STAT. ANN¢. § 41-510 (1947).
34

3T Western Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Lamson Bros. & Co. et al., 42 F. Supp. 1007
(S. D. Ia. 1941); see Hensley v. Green, 36 F. Supp. 671 (W. D. S. C. 1940).
38 269 App. Div. 224, 54 N. Y. S. (2d) 522 (1945); see also, Melvin Pine &
Co. v. McConnell et al., 273 App. Div. 218, 76 N. Y. S. (2d) 279 (1948).
39 269 App. Div. 224, 54 N. Y. S. (2d) 522, 526 (1945).
40 Wein v. Crockett, _.Utah...., 195 P. (2d) 222 (1948).
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however, the assertion of this power over citizens seems capable of being
justified when an incident to a legitimate exefcise of the police power,
without regard to constitutional prohibitions against exclusion. Moreover, this result seems attainable without any departure from the conclusions in Hess v. Pawloski and Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman,
although concededly a shift of emphasis would be necessary. To hold
that the assertion of this jurisdiction over any nonresident doing any
sort of business within the territorial limits of the state is in itself a
legitimate exercise of the police power would, however, seem to require
the Supreme Court to go further than it has gone thus far. Whether
this step will be taken must remain a matter of speculation.
John H. O'Hara

Partnership
FAMILY PARTNERSHIPS AND THE FEDERAL INcoME TAX LAW

Although one of the most troublesome taxation aspects of the family
partnership has been alleviated by the passage of an act permitting
the splitting of income between husband and wife,' there still remain
the questions which arise under the parent-child partnership and its
accompanying tax problems. Because of the close relationship between
the partners, alleged family partnerships are closely scrutinized by
the Internal Revenue Department. The deteriination of what constitutes a bona fide family partnership has resulted in some seemingly
irreconcilable cases in which a great variety of tests or criteria have
been applied. In order better to understand the tests which have been
relied on in the recent decisions, an examination of the tests used at
common law and more recently under the Uniform Partnership Act
should be helpful.
Towards the end of the Eighteenth Century, the rule was laid
down in the English case of Grace v. Smith,2 that any persons who

shared in the profits of a business were liable as partners therein,
whether or not they intended to create a partnership. This rule, called
the "profit sharing test," was extremely broad and could include
innumerable business arrangements which probably would not qualify
as partnerships today. Nearly a century later this broad rule, which
had proved difficult to apply because of its generality, was supplemented
by a new test which all but overruled the profit sharing test. In Cox v.
Hickman,8 the "mutual agency test" was used for the first time. This
1
2

8

Revenue Act of 1948, 62 STAT. 111 (1948), 26 U. S. C. § 12(d) (Supp. 1949).
2 Black. W. 998, 96 Eng. Rep. 587 (1775).
8 H. L. Cas. 268, 11 Eng. Rep. 431 (1860).
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new test appeared from the decision to be merely an addition to the
older test; but the effect, as it later developed, was to supplant the
"profit sharing test." A third test was used in a case which appeared
a few years after Cox v. Hickman. In this case, Mollwo v. The Court
of Wards,4 it was suggested by Sir Montague Smith that the prime
factor as to the existence of a partnership was the intention of the
partners. Later decisions made use of this "intention test" in con5
junction with the other tests already established.
That the test of "mutual agency" established in the English cases
found a place in American law is evidenced by the decision in an early
Michigan case 6 in which Justice Cooley, in praising the test formu7
lated in Cox v. Hickman, stated:
There is something understandable by the common mind in this test;
there is nothing artificial or arbitrary about it; it falls in 'with reason
and enables every man to know when he makes his business arrangements
whether he runs the risk of extraordinary liabilities contracted without
his consent or approval,

In the same decision it is stated that in general the intent of the
partners should govern, except where rights of deceived third parties
intervene; 8 however, if this intention is to form an association that
qualifies as a partnership under the above rule, it will be treated as a
partnership regardless of what the parties may call it.

The test applied by Justice Cooley was stated as follows: 9
community of interest in some lawful commerce or business, for the
conduct of which the parties eventually are principals of and agents for
each other, with general powers within the scope of the business, which
powers however by agreement between the. parties themselves may be
restricted at option, to the extent even of making one the sole agent
of the others and of the business.
The rule set down in the above decision and the rule in a later
Supreme Court decision of that time1 0 constitute the tests applied
, . .

today
ments
Act. 12
to be
4

in most jurisdictions under the common law" and their elehave been codified by states adopting the Uniform Partnership
The Uniform Partnership Act does not specifically set up tests
applied. There is, however, nothing in the Act contrary to the

L. R. 4 P. C. 419, 17 Eng. Rep. 495 (1872).
See, e.g., James Bailey Co. v. Darling, 119 Me. 598, 111 Atl. 410 (1920).
6 Beecher v. Bush, 45 Mich. 188, 7 N.W. 785 (1881).
7 7 N.W. at 787.
s Id. at 789.
9 Ibid.
10 Meehan v. Valentine, 145 U. S. 611, 623, 12 S. Ct. 972, 36 L. Ed. 835
(1892), where it is stated that "those persons are partners, who contribute either
property or money to carry on a joint business for their common benefit, and who
own and share the profits thereof in certain proportions."
11 Moore v. DuBard, 318 Mich. 578, 29 N.W. (2d) 94 (1947).
12 7 UmnOaRx LAWS AwN. (1949).
5
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tests, and after its passage in the individual states the common law
rules continued in effect.' 3
Determining whether a partnership exists is primarily a matter of
weighing all the facts and circumstances in a particular case. The
tests are, in reality, elements to be applied in reaching a final determination as to the validity of the partnership. Before the Internal
Revenue Act of 1913,14 and the tax cases arising thereunder, the court
could safely apply a broad, inclusive rule, since the largest percentage
of cases involved defendants attempting to prove they were not
members of a partnership. The issue in most cases was whether a
party claiming not to be a partner was to be charged with a partner's
unlimited liability; partnership was a trap one sought to avoid. Under
such conditions, a rule which was broad enough to observe the equitable
rights of both litigants was workable.
Since the enactment of the Internal Revenue Act of 1913, however, such tests have not been workable. The partnership has become
a refuge for those seeking to avoid or in some cases evade payment
of income taxes. Where formerly the rule had been one of inclusion,
it is necessary now that it take on the aspects of a rule of exclusion.
Because of this change of circumstances, the tax courts, which originally followed the partnership law of the states wherein they sat,
were forced to abandon the local interpretations and attempt to establish a more restrictive set of rules. As the Government sought ways
to overcome schemes for avoiding or evading taxation, new rules
appeared which differed greatly from the common law rules. A subjective approach was developed in a 1940 tax case. 15 There a short
term trust was created by a husband, in which his wife was named as
beneficiary. He retained discretion as to the amount of income to be
paid out, the power to vote the stock, and the right to handle the
principal, and provided for a remainder to himself on expiration of
the trust. It was held that the income diverted to the "trust" remained
part of the husband's taxable income. The Supreme Court stated: 16
Technical considerations, niceties of the law of trusts or conveyances,
or the legal paraphernalia which inventive genius may construct as a
refuge from surtaxes should not obscure the basic issue. That issue is
whether the grantor after the trust has been established may still be
treated, under this statutory scheme, as the owner of the corpus... For
where the head of the household has income in excess of normal needs,
it may well make but little difference to him (except income-tax-wise)
where portions of that income are routed--so long as it stays in the
family group. In those circumstances the all-important factor might be
13

See, e.g., State Street Trust Co. v. Hall, 311 Mass. 299, 41 N.E. (2d) 30

(1942).
14

Revenue Act of 1913, 38 STAT. 116 (1913).

15
16

Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331, 60 S. Ct. 554, 84 L. Ed. 788 (1940).
309 U. S. at 334-6.
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retention by him of control over the principal. With that control in his
hands he would keep direct command over all that he needed to remain
in substantially the same financial situation as before.

This Court was not applying formal tests. It was inquiring directly
into the substance of the particular case before it. In a later 1940
case, 17 this theory was expanded so that under some circumstances
control of the use of income may be sufficient to prevent the recognition
of a partnership for tax purposes, though the income never is personally
received by the taxpayer. The trend at this time was toward looking
through the partnership form and taxing that member of an association or party to an agreement whom the court decided was the creator
of the income.
In decisions just prior to Commissioner v. Tower 18 and Commissioner v. Lusthaus,19 there was a growing tendency to consider
contributions of income and services as prerequisites to a bona fide
family partnership for tax purposes. In complying with these prerequisites, the husband or father would make a gift to the wife or
child and the donee would in turn invest the gift in the business and
relinquish all control over it, thus obtaining the benefit of the partner20
ship as an income-splitting device.
A similar method was used by the taxpayers in both the Tower and
Lusthaus decisions, but in these cases the Supreme Court disallowed
the partnership. In both these cases the Court found that the gift by
the husband made no substantial change in the economic relation of
the family members, and that the income produced by the wife's
investment continued to be used in the business or for family purposes.
In considering such a gift to be a mere transfer on paper, the Court
used the following much-quoted language:'1
There can be no question that a wife and a husband may, under certain circumstances, become partners for tax, as for other, purposes. If
she either invests capital originating with her or substantially contributes

to the control and management of the business, or otherwise performs
vital additional services, or does all of these things she may be a partner
as contemplated by 26 U.S.C.A. 1945 ed., §§ 181, 182, 6 F.C.A. Title 26
§§ 181, 182. The Tax Court has recognized that under such circumstances
the income belongs to the wife. A wife may become a general or a limited
partner with her husband. But when she does not share in the management and control of the business, contributes no vital additional service,
and where the husband purports in some way to have given her a partnership interest, the Tax Court may properly take these circumstances into
consideration in determining whether the partnership is real within the
meaning of the federal revenue laws.
Helvering v. Horst, 311 U. S. 112, 61 S. Ct. 144, 85 L. Ed. 75 (1940).
327 U. S. 280, 66 S. Ct. 532, 90 L. Ed. 670 (1946).
19 327 U. S. 293, 66 S. Ct. 539, 90 L. Ed. 679 (1946).
20 See, e.g., M. W. Smith Jr., 3 TC 894 (1944); Davis B. Thornton, 5 TC
17

18

116 (1945).
21

See note 18 supra, 327 U. S. at 290.
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The Tax Court construed this language of the Tower case as setting
out two distinct tests: "original contribution" and "vital services." 22
Although the Supreme Court did not lay these "tests" down as a rule
of law, the Tax Court has so applied them in similar cases, with adverse
results to the taxpayer. 23 In these cases- the Tax Court considered
this language of the Tower case to be broad enough to rule out all
family partnerships where the wife's or child's capital originated with
the husband, and seemingly refused to inquire into other surrounding
facts to determine the intent of the parties making the agreement. In
thus limiting its attention to the narrow "tests" which it gleaned from
the Tower decision, the Tax Court was continuing to maintain a
separate set of requisites for the existence of a partnership for tax
purposes.
In the recent case of Commissioner v. Culbertson 24 the Tax Court
had again applied the dual test of "original capital" and "vital services,"
which it has applied since the Tower decision, and ignored the intent
of the parties forming the partnership. In this case, the taxpayer was
a partner in the cattle business with a non-family partner; this partnership was dissolved and the taxpayer formed another with his four
sons and purchased the assets of the dissolved business for $115,348.
Half of this amount was paid by the sons by issuing a note to their
father. This note was paid as follows: gifts from the taxpayer,
$21,744; credit for overcharge, $5,930; and one half of a loan procured by the new partnership, $30,000. The loan was repaid from the
proceeds derived from operation of the ranch. The oldest son was
in service during part of the taxable years involved; the next oldest
went directly to the army from college and rendered no service to the
partnership; the younger sons worked on the ranch only in the summer.
In remanding the Culbertson case to the Tax Court for a determination as to which of the sons were intended as partners, the Supreme
Court pointed out that in the Tower decision it had stated that the
determination of what constitutes a family partnership for income tax
26
purposes depends upon:
. . . whether the partners really and truly intended to join together for
the purpose of carrying on business and sharing in the profits or losses
or both. And their intention in this respect is a question of fact, to be
determined from testimony disclosed by their "agreement, considered
as a whole, and by their conduct in execution of its provisions." [citing]
Drennan v. London Assurance Corp., 113 U. S. 51, 56, 5 S. Ct. 341, 28
L. Ed. 919.
22 William 0. Culbertson, P-H 1947 TC Maa. Dxc. Smrv. 47,168 (1947).
28 See, e.g., Ed. Dubinsky Durwood, 6 TC 682 (1946); Floyd D. Akers, 6

TC 673 (1946).
24

335 U. S. 883, 69 S. Ct. 1210 (1949).

25

See note 18 supra, 327 U. S. at 287.
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Referring to the Tax Court's application of the dual tests of "original
capital" and "vital services," the Supreme Court said: 28
It treated as essential to membership in a family partnership for tax
purposes the contribution of either "vital services" or "original capital."
Use of these "tests" of partnership indicates, at best, an error in emphasis.
It ignores what 'we said is the ultimate question for decision, namely,
"whether the partnership is real within the meaning of the federal
revenue laws" and makes decisive what we described as "circumstances
(to be taken) into consideration" in making that determination.

The Culbertson decision thus completely dispels the Tax Court's
theory that the capital invested must originate with the investor, and
reaffirms in substance the principle announced in the Tower case, that

there is no such thing as a partnership for tax purposes different from
one for commercial purposes.
In other words, the question of what constitutes a bona fide partnership for tax or other purposes again becomes one of intent; or it
might be said it is one of determining the existence of a partnership
according to common law standards. This determination involves a
consideration of all the facts surrounding the arrangement, and not
the objective dual test applied by the Tax Court for the past three
years; it involves" a consideration of the capital contribution, vital
services, control in management, the formal agreement and control of
income. If from these facts the court can determine that there was a
bona fide intent to form a partnership, it cannot rule out that possibility merely because one or moxe of the elements listed above is
absent, for none of the criteria is a conclusive "test," as such, but is
merely a guide for the court in its determination. Although a lack of
one or more of these criteria may place an additional burden on the
taxpayer to prove his case, it is not conclusive evidence against the
existence of a bona fide partnership.
John B. Palmer
John G. Smith

28

See note 24 suPra,69 S. CL at 1213.

